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Trading Unmoored: The Uncertain Legal
Foundation for Emissions Trading Under
§ 111 of the Clean Air Act
Nathan Richardson*
ABSTRACT
The EPA's "Clean Power Plan" will for the first time impose green-
house gas emission limits on existing fossil fuel power plants.' The Plan
envisions trading among regulated emitters, and such trading appears
crucial to the Plan's cost-effectiveness. The Plan's projected emissions
reductions are significant, making it a core element of President Obama's
climate policy and crucial to fulfillment of the country's international
commitments. But the Plan is controversial and is based on a rarely used
provision of the Clean Air Act, § 111 (d). Litigation has already begun
and will undoubtedly intensify. In an earlier work, I argued that § 111 (d)
does not allow use of some flexible regulatory tools (including many
forms of offsets) but that it appears to allow emissions trading among
regulated sources. This Article looks more deeply at the legal authority
to allow emissions trading under § 111 (d). Most legal arguments to date
over trading have focused on past EPA practice or the statutory defini-
tion of performance standards. But neither source of authority is suffi-
cient to answer the question-in fact, there is little or no statutory guid-
ance on whether trading is legally available when emitters must actually
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Fellow, Resources for the Future. Thanks to my colleagues at South Carolina for their
comments and critiques, and especially to Kate Konschinik at Harvard, Jonas Monast at
Duke, and Dallas Burtraw at Resources for the Future for their ideas, close reading, and
suggestions. Thanks also to Art Fraas, Josh Eagle, and Derek Black (among many others)
for making small but important suggestions that inspired new avenues of research, and to
Matthew Shaud for invaluable research assistance.
1. The EPA released the final Clean Power Plan just before this article went to press.
While the discussion regarding and quotations from the plan here are based on the pro-
posed rule, preliminary analysis of the final rule has not revealed any changes that will
significantly impact this analysis. Emissions trading is still encouraged by EPA and as-
sumed in the final rule's regulatory impact analysis, and the agency's legal arguments in
favor of trading are similar.
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comply. Judicial deference to agency interpretation means trading may
be legal, but uncertainty remains. It is even possible that courts could
resort to new legal doctrines or revive the nondelegation doctrine to re-
solve the question. Even if courts do eventually approve trading, legal
uncertainty over this crucial aspect of climate policy is underappreciated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") proposed
the "Clean Power Plan" ("CPP" or the "Plan").2 As proposed, the Plan is
the largest and most important component of the agency's efforts to
regulate greenhouse gases ("GHGs") under the Clean Air Act ("CAA" or
the "Act"). These efforts commenced in earnest after the Supreme
Court's 2007 ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA that greenhouse gases are
"air pollutants" within the definition of the CAA.3 In the absence of
Congressional action on climate change (such as a federal carbon tax),
these regulatory efforts are the cornerstone of federal climate policy and
arguably the most important developments in environmental law in re-
cent decades. They are not without controversy, however: the CPP in
particular is already the target of political and legal challenge, and further
challenges are certain in the future.4
Critics make a variety of political or policy arguments-for exam-
ple, some claim that the EPA should not take action in an area where leg-
islation in Congress has failed (referring to 2009 cap-and-trade legisla-
2. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,832 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter "CPP"].
3. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 14-1112 (D.C. Cir. filed June 18,
2014) (arguing in petition that EPA lacks authority to regulate power plants under Sec-
tion 111 (d) of the Clean Air Act), pet. for writ ofprohibition denied, In re Murray Energy
Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
2015]
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tion that passed the House but failed in the Senate).5 Others repeat a
longstanding argument that unilateral U.S. emissions reductions, alone,
will have little impact on climate risks.6 Proponents of strong U.S. cli-
mate action have attempted to rebut these arguments and advanced others
in favor of the proposal.'
A. The Clean Power Plan and Emissions Trading
Under the Plan, the EPA will (through the states) impose carbon
performance standards on existing fossil-fueled (primarily coal and natu-
ral gas) power plants.8 The proposal is based on authority granted to the
EPA and the states by § 111 (d) of the CAA, a rarely-used provision.
9
When and if the existing source performance standards ("ESPS") embod-
ied by the Plan are finalized and implemented, they will be environmen-
tally and economically important-the EPA projects power sector emis-
sions reductions of 30 percent over 2005 levels by 2030, with total
benefits of $55-93 billion.10 The Plan will subject the carbon emissions
of a large sector of the economy to federally-led regulation for the first
time. Even if the final CPP differs substantially from the proposal, costs
and benefits will almost certainly remain large.
5. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Clean Power Plan Is Unconstitutional, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/laurence-tribe-the-epas-clean-power-
plan-is-unconstitutional-1419293203 (arguing that "[t]he brute fact is that the Obama
administration failed to get climate legislation through Congress. Yet the EPA is acting as
though it has the legislative authority anyway to re-engineer the nation's electric generat-
ing system and power grid. It does not"). See also William Yeatman, EPA's Illegitimate
Climate Rule, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. ONPOINT 2 (July 28, 2014)
http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Yeatman%20-
%20EPAs%20Illegitimate%20Climate%2ORule O.pdf (arguing that "EPA's Clean Power
Plan [l]acks Congressional [a]uthorization" because Congress has rejected "legislation
that would have implemented a national climate change mitigation plan").
6. See, e.g., Marita Noon, EPA Clean Power Plan: All Pain - No Gain for American
Jobs & Energy, HEARTLAND INST. BLOG,(Sept. 19, 2014),
http:/Iblog.heartland.org/2014/09/epa-clean-power-plan-all-pain-no-gain-for-american-
jobs-and-energy/ (arguing that "[tihe proposed EPA plan will cause harsh economic con-
sequences while having virtually no impact on the reported goal of stopping global cli-
mate change").
7. See, e.g., Comments on EPA's Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Generation Units, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://docs.nrdc.org/air/files/air_14120101b.pdf (noting that "NRDC
strongly supports this approach, which fully comports with the Clean Air Act" and argu-
ing that the CPP is a "groundbreaking step toward combating climate change").
8. See generally CPP, supra note 3.
9. See id. at 34,832.
10. See Overview of the Clean Power Plan: Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power
Plants, EPA.GOV, http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/fact-sheet-clean-
power-plan-overview (last updated May 11, 2015).
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Moreover, the CPP will likely be the most significant and ambitious
carbon-cutting measures taken to date at the federal level-only the
EPA's stringent new fleet fuel economy ("CAFE") standards for road
vehicles are of similar magnitude.1' If the U.S. is to meet its ambitious
emissions-reduction commitments, reducing emissions from the electric
power sector is essential, and the CPP is the federal government's prima-
ry program for doing so.
12
That success depends in large part on whether states' regulatory ef-
forts under the Plan can include emissions trading among regulated pow-
er plants. Here (and throughout this Article), emissions trading refers to
the ability of regulated emitters to trade among themselves such that they
collectively meet a target set by a regulator (such as a total emissions cap
or average emissions rate), without any specific source being required to
meet an emissions target. In principle, emissions trading should reduce
the cost of achieving a given emissions outcome, or enable more ambi-
tious environmental goals to be achieved at the same costs as a regulato-
ry program without it.
Although implementation is at least initially up to states, the EPA's
proposal argues that trading is legal and encourages and envisions states'
use of trading in their plans. 3 But § 111 (d) of the CAA does not explic-
itly say whether trading is allowed, and the issue has never been resolved
by a court in the 45-year history of the provision. The core question is
relatively simple: May regulators allow regulated power plants to trade
with each other (and, perhaps, get credit for certain off-site emissions-
cutting projects) such that their collective average emissions meet a set
standard? Or, must each plant individually comply with that standard?
The issue matters. Economic evidence suggests that trading is cru-
cial to the Plan's cost-effectiveness, with costs increasing greatly if it is
11. See EPA, REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT: EPA AND NHTSA FINALIZE
HISTORIC NATIONAL PROGRAM TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES AND IMPROVE FUEL
ECONOMY FOR CARS AND TRUCKS 2 (Apr. 2010),
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/420flOO14.pdf (noting that finalized 2012-
2016 fuel economy (CAFE) standards for light-duty vehicles are projected to achieve
emissions reductions of 21% by 2030 from the regulated vehicles and net benefits of
around $190 billion). Note that also-finalized and even more stringent fuel economy
standards for 2017-2025 will achieve additional emissions reductions and benefits.
12. See Fact Sheet: U.S. Reports its 2025 Emissions Target to the UNFCCC,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its-2025-emissions-target-unfccc (noting US
commitment of 26-28% emissions reductions below 2005 levels by 2025, and listing the
Clean Power Plan's projected power sector emissions reductions of 30% by 2030 first
among US emissions-cutting policies).
13. See CPP, supra note 3, at 34,927. EPA's arguments are discussed in detail in
Section 0.
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not available.14 Specifically, this economic analysis indicates that, if the
EPA and state regulators must restrict compliance options under the
ESPS to emissions reductions at individual plants, the per-unit cost of
such reductions will be substantially greater. As a result, the Plan would
lead to fewer emissions reductions, greater costs, or (most likely) both.
This is especially true with regard to reallocation of generation from coal
power plants to lower-emitting natural gas power plants. Such realloca-
tion or re-dispatch appears to be, by far, the largest and lowest-cost emis-
sions reduction opportunity available in the power sector, and likely in
the entire U.S. economy, rivaled only by improvements in consumer en-
ergy efficiency15 (setting aside for now continuing debates over the vol-
ume of fugitive methane emissions from natural gas production).16
B. The Trading Debate
Given the controversy over the CPP and the economic stakes, litiga-
tion over the legality of trading is likely. This Article discusses possible
outcomes of such a challenge. Previous legal analysis has largely sup-
ported the EPA's pro-trading view, though a few critics (mostly, but not
entirely, backed by regulated industries) have taken the opposite view by
arguing that trading is incompatible with the statute.17 This debate has
focused on two battlegrounds. One is past EPA practice, where there are
a few examples of trading. The other is the text of the statute, particular-
ly the meaning of its requirement that performance standards "reflect
[the] best system of emission reduction.
'' 8
In this Article, I argue that neither side's legal arguments are very
strong, and that therefore, the legal status of trading under the CPP is
much more uncertain than previously understood. Past EPA practice is
of limited value since it points in both directions and has never been test-
ed in court. More importantly, the "best system" language, however one
interprets it, is irrelevant since it governs only the EPA's discretion in
setting the standards, and not emitters' options for complying.
14. This evidence, including modeling of hypothetical CAA carbon regulation with
and without trading, is discussed in detail in Section 0.
15. See, e.g., ANTHONY PAUL ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TAXING ELECTRIC-
ITY SECTOR CARBON EMISSIONS AT SOCIAL COST 13-15 (2013),
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-13-23-REV.pdf (finding via modeling of
the US electric power sector that a small carbon tax leads primarily to large-scale "substi-
tution of gas for coal" while higher tax values lead to increased switching to nuclear and
renewable generation).
16. See, e.g., Michael Levi, Climate Consequences of Natural Gas As a Bridge Fuel,
118 CLIMATIC CHANGE 609 (2013).
17. See infra Section 0 for discussion of both sides' arguments to date.
18. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2012); see also Clean Air Act § 111 (a),
42 U.S.C. § 7411 (a) (2012).
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In particular, § 111, 1 argue, says almost nothing about the legality
of the most significant option made available under EPA's current pro-
posal-trading among regulated sources.19 The issue here is not merely
that the statute is ambiguous regarding an important question, contrary to
claims on both sides of a debate that plain language is on their side. That
would be significant, though relatively common and unsurprising. Here,
the statute is not just ambiguous-it is silent. And it is silent about not
just an important question, but arguably the most important factors de-
termining the shape of the regulation.
Since regulation under the CAA became the clear path forward for
federal climate policy, scholars and interested parties have observed that
§ 111 (d), a short and rarely-used provision, gives little guidance on what
regulations based on the authority it grants will look like.20 In fact, poli-
cymaking under the ESPS appears to be unmoored by statutory con-
straints to an even greater detail than these observers (myself included)
had previously realized.
C. Does the EPA Get to Decide?
How a reviewing court (initially the D.C. Circuit, and possibly the
U.S. Supreme Court on appeal) would resolve this statutory gap is un-
clear. It is possible that the outcome would be simple: deference to the
EPA's discretion in the face of congressional ambiguity, following Chev-
ron. This would preserve trading. But congressional silence could be
interpreted against the agency-the statutory gap might be too big. The
large economic significance of the CPP and its basis in thin statutory text
might also inspire a court to decide on more innovative and ambitious
grounds. Dicta in other Clean Air Act cases2' have suggested a limita-
tion on Chevron deference in such cases, and even a successful nondele-
gation challenge cannot be ruled out entirely. In short, it is possible that
litigation over trading will occasion a shift in the doctrine regarding def-
erence to agency interpretations of law. Even if no doctrinal shift occurs
19. Somewhat more precisely, the statute says almost nothing about what range of
compliance options regulators (states or EPA) are delegated authority to allow regulated
existing sources to use.
20. See, e.g., Environmental Law Institute, Resolved: EPA and States Can Regulate
Emissions Outside the Facility Fence Line
Under Clean Air Act §1l, 44 ELR 10255, 10255 (2014) (including a debate tran-
script in which David Doniger of environmental group NRDC argues § 111 (d) is largely a
blank slate for EPA regulation. Jeffrey Holmstead counters that, while the provision is
not the "40 year old virgin" Doniger claims, it is still a relatively broad grant of authority,
albeit one that, he argues, must be applied to each facility individually).
21. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 485 (2001); Util. Air Regulatory
Grp. (UARG) v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014).
2015]
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and this is more or less a standard application of Chevron, the legality of
trading under § 111 (d) is uncertain.
D. Implications
Even if the EPA eventually prevails, such great uncertainty is not
good for effective policymaking. It makes regulated firms' decisions on
capital investments in power plants much more difficult (and more likely
to be wrong in retrospect, with long-term effects on ratepayers), reduces
incentives to take early action to cut emissions, puts a greater burden on
already-stretched state regulators, and weakens the influence of U.S. ne-
gotiators in international climate talks. The only sure solution is Con-
gressional action, which appears unlikely in the current political envi-
ronment.
E. Structure
The following three Sections of this Article provide background in-
formation about the EPA's proposed CPP. Section II of this Article de-
scribes the statutory scheme for performance standards under § 111 of
the CAA, while Sections III and IV discuss the proposed Clean Power
Plan and the significance of trading for the Plan, respectively. If you are
already familiar with the CPP, these sections can safely be skipped.
This Article's legal analysis is presented in the subsequent sections.
Section V briefly describes legal arguments regarding trading among
new emissions sources, followed by in-depth analysis of arguments for
and against trading for existing sources in Section VI. Section VII dis-
cusses how courts might resolve statutory ambiguity regarding trading.
Finally, conclusions and implications are presented in Section VIII.
II. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Among the many tools available under the CAA for limiting air pol-
lution are performance standards for stationary emissions sources under
§ 111 of the statute. These standards are traditionally referred to as "new
source performance standards" (or "NSPS") because, in their most com-
mon form (governed by § 111(b) of the statute), they apply only to new
(or modified) stationary sources.22 CAA § 111 (d), however, also pro-
vides authority for applying performance standards to existing, unmodi-
23fied sources in specific contexts.
22. Clean Air Act § 111 (b).
23. Id. at § 11 l(d). To avoid the oxymoronic term "existing source NSPS," this Arti-




NSPS are among the most frequently used regulatory tools in the
CAA, and have a long history. The process for setting these standards
works as follows. As a threshold matter, CAA § 11 (b) requires the
EPA to specify categories of stationary emissions ources that "cause[]
or contribute[] significant[ly] to[] air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. ' 4 This standard is sim-
ilar to that used elsewhere in the CAA to determine which pollutants
should be regulated under the act,25 but here, the statutory test is whether
the group of sources emits air pollutants that endanger health or welfare.
The agency has broad powers to define and revise these "source catego-
ries' '26 and has listed a large number of such categories in the Code of
Federal Regulations, covering sources in all major industrial sectors of
the economy.7
Once a source category has been defined, the EPA is directed by the
statute to propose "standards of performance" for new sources in the cat-
28egory. CAA § 111(b), however, says very little about the scope or
character of these standards.29 As is often the case, the statutory defini-
tions section (§ 111(a)) does most of the work. For example, "new
source" is defined to include not only newly constructed sources but also
those that undergo modifications that increase their emissions.3°
Most importantly for our purposes, § 111(a) defines "standard of
performance" to mean:
•.. a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the
degree of emissions limitation achievable through the applica-
tion of the best system of emission reduction which (taking in-
to account the cost of achieving such reduction and any non air
quality health and environmental impact and energy require-
ments) the Administrator determines has been adequately
demonstrated.31
To set a performance standard as defined in § 1 11 (a), therefore, the
agency first identifies options available to emitters for reducing their
emissions. It then determines which of the options identified strikes the
24. Id. at § 111(b)(1)(A).
25. See, e.g., id. at § 108; id at § 202.
26. See id. at § lIl(b)(1)(A).
27. See 40 C.F.R. § 60 (2014) (listing over 90 separate standards of performance
covering sectors from "Large Municipal Waste Combustors That are Constructed on or
Before September 20, 1994" to "Existing Sewage Sludge Incineration Units").
28. Clean Air Act § 11 (b)(1)(B).
29. Id.
30. See id at §§ Il1(a)(2), (3).
31. Id. at § Ill(a)(1).
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right balance (in the agency's view) between emissions-reducing effec-
tiveness, cost, and the other factors identified in the definition and is
available in practice (i.e., has been "adequately demonstrated"). This
gives the EPA an unenviable task of balancing these criteria. In practice,
the EPA has identified "best systems" based on extensive technical anal-
ysis of options available to emitters for reducing their emissions; tradi-
tionally these have been technological upgrades.32
Once the agency has identified a "best system of emission reduc-
tion," it then sets a performance standard, usually expressed as an emis-
sions rate (i.e., tons of a pollutant per hour) based on the emissions per-
formance the EPA believes can be achieved through application of its
identified system. As § 1 11 (a) specifies, the performance standard "re-
flects the degree of emission reduction achievable through the applica-
tion of the best system." In other words, the EPA's identification of the
"best system" determines the stringency of the regulation.
New sources to which the performance standard is applied are not,
however, required to use the identified "best system." CAA § I I l (b)(5)
specifies that:
... nothing in this section shall be construed to require, or to
authorize the Administrator to require, any new or modified
source to install and operate and particular technological sys-
tem of continuous emission reduction to comply with any new
source standard of performance.33
In other words, regulated sources must meet the standard (again,
usually an emissions rate), but are not limited to the compliance option
on which the EPA based that standard, or even to the set of options the
EPA considered. A regulated source, for example, could use new tech-
nology that the EPA concluded in its analysis had not been "adequately
demonstrated," or could switch to a cleaner fuel instead of using the
technology on which the EPA had based the standard.
This freedom to use compliance options other than those identified
by the regulator is what makes § 111 regulations "performance stand-
ards" rather than command-and-control regulations. Performance stand-
ards offer flexibility to regulated entities and are favored by many econ-
omists and other policy analysts for their ability to reduce costs and
32. See DANIEL FARBER & ANN CARLSON, CASES & MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 495-96 (9th ed. 2014) (noting that NSPS "are the result of an intensive examination
by agency and consultant engineers of particular classes of equipment, focusing on stack
and fugitive emissions, available controls, costs, and alternative compliance regimes").
33. Clean Air Act § III(b)(5).
[Vol. 120:1
TRADING UNMOORED:
encourage innovation.34 Firms may be able to comply with a perfor-
mance standard by doing something that the regulator did not consider,
or idiosyncratic conditions may make an option that the regulator
deemed costly or impractical on a general basis attractive for an individ-
ual firm. And firms that can innovate and control their emissions more
cheaply have every incentive to do so. Under command-and-control
regulation, which specifies a single means to comply, these options and
incentives would be absent.
As discussed in detail below, the text of § 111 imposes few, if any,
limits on the compliance options available to regulated emitters-the
regulations are true performance standards.
Once the EPA has set NSPS for a source category, the statute re-
quires the agency to review those standards at least every eight years."
The agency must update the standard to reflect new information regard-
ing the "best system," (presumably resulting in tighter standards as tech-
nology and knowledge improve,) or the agency may "determine that such
review is not appropriate in light of readily available information.
3 6
The EPA has used the above-described process to issue a large
number of NSPS over the past four decades, covering new sources in al-
most every class of stationary sources, from coal plants to oil and gas
drilling operations.37
B. Existing Sources
Generally speaking, existing stationary emissions sources that are
not being modified are not subject to performance standards. These un-
modified sources must meet applicable NSPS when constructed, but are
not subject to future, presumably stricter, performance standards. In-
stead, most emissions from existing sources are regulated under other
CAA programs. For six "criteria" pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide
(SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), ozone, and lead, states are charged with
meeting national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) set by the EPA
and have broad authority to regulate any sources-including existing
sources-within the state to do so.38 These state regulations are con-
tained within state implementation plans, or SIPs, which are subject to
34. See, e.g., WALLACE E. OATES, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
30-31 (1996) (arguing that because of lower information requirements and greater effi-
ciency, "a strong case can be made ... for the use of performance standards instead of
technology-based standards").
35. Clean Air Act § llI(b)(1)(B).
36. Id.
37. See 40 C.F.R. § 60 (2014).
38. See CleanAir Act § 110.
2015]
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EPA approval.39 For hazardous or toxic pollutants, both new and exist-
ing sources are subject to separate, more stringent federal performance
standards under § 112 of the CAA.
4°
However, not every air pollutant falls into one of these two catego-
ries-criteria pollutants with corresponding NAAQS or hazardous pollu-
tants regulated under § 112. For such pollutants, CAA § 111 (d) provides
a mechanism for regulating emissions from existing sources with per-
formance standards-the ESPS.4' Section 111 (d) was apparently a very
late addition to the 1970 Clean Air Act, created in response to House and
Senate disagreement over how (and whether) to fill this regulatory gap.42
This provision has only very rarely been used, largely because there
are few pollutants with significant health or welfare impacts that have
not been regulated under the NAAQS or § 112. In fact, until its recent
proposal, the EPA had only issued thirteen regulations imposing ESPS
under § 111 (d) since the provision was created in the 1970s, six of which
are separately mandated by another CAA provision.3
Carbon dioxide and many other GHGs, however, do fall into this
statutory gap. GHGs have not been listed by the EPA as a criteria pollu-
tant subject to the NAAQS 44 or as a hazardous pollutant under § 112.
Section 111 (d) ESPS have therefore taken on major new significance, as
39. Id.
40. See id. at § 112.
41. Id. at § 11 (d). Because of differences between the House and Senate versions
of the 1990 amendments to the CAA that were not properly resolved in conference, some
controversy over which sources may be regulated under Section 11 l(d) persists. See also
Kate Konschnik, EPA 's 111(d) Authority - Follow Homer and Avoid the Sirens, LEGAL
PLANET (May 28, 2014), http://legal-planet.org/2014/05/28/guest-blogger-kate-
konschnik-epas- 11 ld-authority-follow-homer-and-avoid-the-sirens/ (noting that "[s]ome
argue that the 1990 House-originating amendment bars EPA from using 111 (d) to target
unregulated pollution from power plants, since EPA previously regulated power plant
HAPs under Section 112" and that "[t]hese arguments all but void Section 111 (d), since
nearly all major stationary sources are regulated under Section 112"). This issue is cur-
rently being litigated in the D.C. Circuit in Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA (see supra note
5).
42. Robert R. Nordhaus & Avi Zevin, Historical Perspectives on § 111(d) of the
Clean Air Act, 44 ELR 11095, 11096-97 (2014).
43. Robert R. Nordhaus & Ilan W. Gutherz, Regulation of C0 2 Emissions From Ex-
isting Power Plants Under § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: Program Design & Statutory
Authority, 44 ELR 10366, 10372-73 (2014).
44. A strong argument can be made, however, that EPA is legally required to list
GHGs as criteria pollutants, though the NAAQS regulatory program is probably not a
good fit for climate regulation. See generally Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regu-




recognized by researchers after the failure of cap-and-trade legislation in
2009 and as confirmed by EPA's 2014 ESPS proposal.45
ESPS lack the wealth of precedent present in the NSPS context, so
any description of how they work in practice requires greater reliance on
the statutory text and involves some conjecture. Some things, however,
are clear. Broadly speaking, the chief difference between ESPS and
NSPS (beyond the different sources to which they apply) is that for
ESPS, states are the primary regulators, not the federal EPA.
Under § 111 (d), EPA is directed to:
(1) ... prescribe regulations which shall establish a procedure
similar to that provided by [CAA § 110] under which each
State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which
(A) establishes standards of performance for any existing
source for any air pollutant. . .to which a standard of per-
formance under this section would apply if such existing
source were a new source, and
(B) provides for the implementation and enforcement of
such standards of performance. Regulations of the Admin-
istrator under this paragraph shall permit the State in ap-
plying a standard of performance to any particular source
under a plan submitted under this paragraph to take into
consideration, among other factors, the remaining useful
life of the existing source to which such standard applies.
(2) The Administrator shall have the same authority-
(A) to prescribe a plan for a State in cases where the State
fails to submit a satisfactory plan as he would have under
section 7410 (c) of this title in the case of failure to submit
an implementation plan...
This short statutory text leaves significant ambiguity as to how reg-
ulations will work in practice, as discussed in detail below. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to draw some conclusions. First, ESPS may only apply
to existing sources in source categories already subject to NSPS.46 Sec-
ond, the EPA's role is primarily one of procedural management and
45. See generally Nathan Richardson, Art Fraas, & Dallas Burtraw, Greenhouse Gas
Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, & Implications of a Knowable
Pathway, 41 ELR 10098 (2011).
46. It is not clear whether ESPS may apply to a source category subject o any
NSPS, or whether the category must be subject to an NSPS for the specific pollutant reg-
ulated by the ESPS in question. For example, coal power plants are subject to a wide va-
riety of NSPS covering S02, NO., and other "conventional" pollutants. It is unclear
whether these NSPS are sufficient to provide the Section 111 (d) legal basis for GHG
ESPS, or whether GHG NSPS must first be imposed (and survive legal challenge).
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oversight. States are the primary regulators. Each state must write a
"plan" detailing the ESPS it will propose and submit that plan to the EPA
for approval. Once approved, states, not the EPA, actually set, imple-
ment, and enforce the performance standards on sources within their
borders. The EPA's role, however, is not purely procedural. It must at
least tell states what their plans must aim to achieve for them to be ap-
proved by the EPA-without such guidance, states would be left to guess
at the EPA's approval criteria. EPA regulations implementing § 1 11 (d)
therefore indicate that the agency will provide substantive "guidelines"
for state plans.47 In practice, these guidelines effectively set the mini-
mum stringency of the ESPS.
This process is an exercise in cooperative federalism, explicitly
modeled on § 1 10 of the CAA,48 under which states must submit plans
(state implementation plans or SIPs) aimed at achieving federally-set na-
tional ambient air quality standards (the NAAQS).49 The NAAQS SIP
process is well understood and is one of the cornerstones of CAA regula-
tion.
Third and finally, the EPA also has a secondary, backstop role.
CAA § 111 (d)(2) grants the EPA authority to prescribe plans applying to
a state that "fails to submit a satisfactory plan" on its own and to enforce
state (or EPA) plan provisions "in cases where the [s]tate fails to enforce
them.,50 These provisions are analogs of similar provisions in § 110 al-
lowing the EPA to write and enforce "federal implementation plans" or
FIPs when states fail to submit adequate SIPs.
47. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.22 (2014) (stating that "[c]oncurrently upon or after proposal
of standards of performance for the control of a designated pollutant from affected facili-
ties, the Administrator will publish a draft guideline document containing information
pertinent to control of the designated pollutant form designated facilities"); see also 40
C.F.R. § 60.23 (stating that "within 9 months after notice of the availability of a final
guideline document is published under § 60.22(a), each State shall adopt and submit to
the Administrator, in accordance with § 60.4 of subpart A of this part, a plan for the con-
trol of the designated pollutant to which the guideline document applies").
48. See Clean Air Act § 11 l(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(d)(1) (2012) (stating that "[tlhe
Administrator shall prescribe regulations which shall establish a procedure similar to that
provided by section 7410 of this title under which each State shall submit to the Adminis-
trator a plan... ").
49. See generally id. at § 110.
50. Id. at§ l1l(d)(2).
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III. REGULATING GHGs UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
A. Historical Background
Using the CAA to regulate GHG emissions was first seriously dis-
cussed in the late 1990s near the end of the Clinton administration.5 1
Under President George W. Bush, however, the EPA argued that GHGs
either could not or should not be regulated under the CAA and refused to
consider regulation.52 That position was challenged by states and envi-
ronmental groups, and was ultimately rejected in 2007 by a 5-4 majority
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.53 Massachusetts
clarified that GHGs are "air pollutants" under the CAA definition, and
therefore are subject to regulation.5 4 The Bush EPA, however, took little
action on GHGs before the 2008 election, issuing only a "Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking.,
55
After the 2008 election, attention shifted from the EPA to Congress.
Democrats' success in the election and the support of both presidential
candidates led many to believe that comprehensive new climate legisla-
tion creating a cap-and-trade system could pass. These hopes were not
fulfilled, however-although the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill
narrowly passed the House in 2009, similar legislation failed in the Sen-
ate.56 Republican success in the 2010 midterm elections, declining sup-
port for climate legislation among some Democrats, and focus on other
political priorities has since made climate legislation politically unrealis-
tic.
51. See PHILIP A. WALLACH, U.S. REGULATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONs 2
(Oct.2012), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2012/10/ 26%20
climate%20change%20wallach/26%20climate%20change%20wallach.pdf (noting that
"[d]uring [the late 1990s], the EPA refrained from taking regulatory action to control
GHG emissions, although under Clinton's Administrator, Carol Browner, the agency in-
dicated that it believed it had the legal power to do so under the Clean Air Act if it for-
mally found that greenhouse gases endanger public health or welfare").
52. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511 (2007) (noting that EPA rejected a
petition seeking climate-driven CAA regulation, and that "[t]he Agency gave two reasons
for its decision: (1) that contrary to the opinions of its former general counsels, the Clean
Air Act does not authorize EPA to issue mandatory regulations to address global climate
change; and (2) that even if the Agency had the authority to set greenhouse gas emission
standards, it would be unwise to do so at this time").
53. Id. at 532.
54. Id. at 528 ("The statutory text forecloses EPA's reading.").
55. See EPA, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act: Ad-
vanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008).
56. See 111th Congress Climate Change Legislation, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/federal/congress/1 1 .
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B. Initial Regulatory Steps-Endangerment and Transportation
Relatively quickly after the failure of cap-and-trade in Congress, it
became clear to many observers and the Obama administration itself that
the CAA once again provided the only plausible pathway forward for
federal climate policy, at least over the short-to-medium term. Scholars
and analysts, drawing on the 2008 NPRM and new economic and legal
analysis, began to identify and study plausible regulatory pathways.7 At
the same time, the EPA itself began to take steps toward regulatory ac-
tion, beginning in late 2009 with an "endangerment finding" formally
stating the agency's view that GHGs present a threat to health and wel-
fare.5"
Although GHG emissions are pervasive throughout the economy,
two sectors-transportation and electric power-account for the signifi-
cant majority of emissions. The EPA therefore has focused its regulatory






Figure 1: US GI-G Emissions by Sector (2012)
59
57. See, e.g., Inimai M. Chettiar & Jason A. Schwartz, The Road Ahead: EPA's Op-
tions & Obligations for Regulating Greenhouse Gases, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY (Apr.
2009), http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/TheRoadAhead.pdf Nathan Richard-
son, Art Fraas, & Dallas Burtraw, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act,
supra note 45.
58. EPA, Endangerment & Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
59. Source: EPA, HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE, SPACE, & TECH., HEARING CHARTER,
EPA's CARBON PLAN: FAILURE BY DESIGN 2 fig.1 (July 30, 2014),
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The first major regulatory steps were aimed at motor vehicle emis-
sions and were based on authority under § 202 of the CAA (not coinci-
dentally, this was the provision at issue in Massachusetts). The agency,
in concert with the Department of Transportation, issued significantly
tightened corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for future
vehicles.60 These regulations require annual fuel economy improvements
up to 54.5 miles per gallon in model year 2025 and are projected to re-
duce US GHG emissions by 6 billion metric tons over their lifespan.
61
C. Regulating Emissions From Electric Power
The EPA next turned its attention to limiting GHG emissions from
the electric power sector. In many ways, the sector is a natural target for
EPA carbon regulation. As noted above, the sector is the single largest
contributor to GHG emissions. Fossil-fueled power plants, especially
coal-fired plants, are the largest emitting facilities in the country.62 In
contrast to motor vehicles and small industrial sources, regulating the
power sector requires regulation at a relatively small number of facilities.
The EPA also has extensive experience regulating these sources, since
they are also major emitters of other pollutants. Perhaps most important-
ly, there is strong evidence that the cheapest large-scale emissions reduc-
tions available in the U.S. economy are in the electric power sector, in
large part due to opportunities to switch from carbon-intensive coal gen-
eration to relatively cleaner gas generation.63
There are, however, particular challenges as well. The electric grid
is a complex system managed by collaboration between independent
firms, regulated utilities, and state and federal government actors. Elec-
tric system reliability is crucial-neither regulators nor consumers are
willing to tolerate reduction in service. And while the EPA has a long
relationship with firms in the industry, that relationship has been marked
with acrimony and litigation as often as productive cooperation.
Perhaps most importantly, the electric power sector involves very
large capital investments with very long time horizons because power
https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/ESPS%20
Hearing%20Charter.pdf.
60. See EPA, Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010);
EPA, 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012).
61. See Regulations & Standards: Light Duty, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/
oms/climate/regs-light-duty.htm (last updated June 18, 2015).
62. See 2013 Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Large Facilities, EPA.GOV,
http://ghgdata.epa.gov/ghgp/main.do (listing and mapping GHG emissions sources in the
US; the 27 largest GHG emitters are all coal-fired power plants) (last visited July 26,
2015).
63. See, e.g., PAUL ET AL., supra note 15.
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plants are expensive and tend to stay in operation for many decades.
This makes it more difficult to achieve significant emissions reductions
through regulation. In the transportation sector, regulations on new vehi-
cles alone-the CAFE standards-are sufficient since the vehicle fleet
turns over relatively quickly as consumers buy new cars. But in the elec-
tric power sector, regulation applying only to new plants can reduce
emissions only very slowly. Coal power plants built 70 years ago are
still in operation today, and the average age of the coal fleet is 42 years.64
Regulation of existing power plants is therefore required if meaningful
progress is to be made at reducing power sector emissions over
timeframes less than a generation.
1. New Sources
That does not mean, however, that regulations on new sources are
meaningless, and indeed the EPA's initial regulatory efforts for the pow-
er sector have been aimed at new sources. These efforts have used two
parallel and interrelated regulatory tools-new source review and the
NSPS.
All major new or modified stationary sources are required to under-
go a case-by-case review process under the CAA called, generally, new
61
source review. In this review, the EPA (or, often, state regulators under
delegated authority) assess construction plans and determine whether the
proposed source's emissions control technology is adequate. Generally,
these reviews require "best available control technology," or BACT.66 In
2011, the EPA issued guidance and rulemakings under which it commit-
ted to consider GHG emissions control technology in future BACT re-
views, at least for very large GHG emitters.67 This and other related
rules were challenged in litigation, and although elements were struck
down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA,65 all new large power plants remain subject to NSR, including
64. Steven Mufson, Vintage U.S. Coal-fired Power Plants Now An 'Aging Feet of




65. Clean Air Act § 169, 42 U.S.C. § 7479 (2012).
66. Id. at § 169(3).
67. See EPA, PSD AND TITLE V PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GASES,
EPA-457/B -11-001, at 2 (Mar. 2011),
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ghgdocs/ghgpermittingguidance.pdf, see also EPA, Prevention of
Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg.
31,514 (June 3, 2010) (restricting GHG NSR to certain large emitting sources).
68. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. (UARG) v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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GHG BACT review.69 Few such reviews have taken place to date, how-
ever, so it is not immediately clear what the EPA will determine is "best
available control technology" for power-plant GHG emissions.
Some of that ambiguity will be resolved when and if NSPS pro-
posed for fossil-fuel electric power plants by the EPA in 201370 (and re-
vised in 2014)71 are finalized. These proposed NSPS would set a maxi-
mum emissions rate (expressed in pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour of
power generation) for three specified source categories of emitters.72
One of these categories broadly covers coal-fired steam power plants,
while the other two cover natural gas plants (including natural gas com-
bined-cycle or NGCC plants).73 The categories are assigned slightly dif-
ferent performance standards of 950-1,110 lbs C0 2/mwh for large gas
plants, and 1,000-1,200 lbs C0 2/mwh for all other plants, including
coal.74 The gas standard can be met by an industry-standard new NGCC
plant, but the coal standard cannot be met by even the most efficient new
coal-fired plant unless it employs carbon capture and storage (CCS)
technology.75
This regulatory decision has proved controversial, with critics
claiming that CCS is not "adequately demonstrated" because § 111 (a) of
the CAA requires technologies on which NSPS are based to be.76 The
EPA counters by claiming that CCS has indeed been demonstrated, and
that in any case no (or almost no) coal plants are likely to be built any-
way.77 It remains to be seen whether the EPA will continue to require
CCS for new coal plants in its final NSPS, set to be issued in 2015.78
69. See Memorandum: Next Steps & Preliminary Views on the Application of Clean
Air Act Permitting Programs to Greenhouse Gases Following the Supreme Court's Deci-
sion in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (July 24, 2014),
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20140724memo.pdf (noting that "[i]n the EPA's cur-
rent view, Step 1 sources remain subject to the PSD BACT requirement for GHG, as well
as other pollutants, if they emit those pollutants at or above certain thresholds").
70. EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Station-
ary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012).
71. EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Station-
ary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1,430 (Jan. 8, 2014) [herein-
after NSPS].
72. Id. at 1,453.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1,447.
75. Id. at 1,430.
76. See Letter from Fred Upton et al., House Committee on Energy & Commerce, to
Gina McCarthy, EPA Administrator (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/ett
ers/20131115EPA.pdf (arguing that CCS is "not commercially viable" and that demon-
stration projects referenced by EPA may not be considered due to provisions of the Ener-
gy Policy Act of 2005).
77. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED STANDARDS OF
PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR NEW STATIONARY SOURCES: ELEC-
TRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS, EPA-452/R-13-003, at 2-2 (Sept. 2013),
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As proposed, the power sector NSPS do not allow any "beyond the
fence line" compliance options-they do not allow trading or crediting of
off-site projects like demand-side energy efficiency. Each new plant in
one of the regulated source categories must individually meet the
NSPS.7 9
When the NSPS are finalized, they will resolve some ambiguity
about future power plant NSR determinations. Since all new sources in a
category with an NSPS must meet that performance standard, the NSPS
serve as an NSR floor. Regulators may determine that BACT requires
better emissions performance than the NSPS, but not worse performance.
2. Existing Sources
The most significant move by the EPA to regulate GHG emissions,
however, was its June 2014 proposed "Clean Power Plan" in which it
proposed performance standards applying to coal and gas power plants
(the same source categories as regulated under the NSPS proposal). The
Plan, along with the agency's NSPS proposal for the same sources was
finalized in August 2015, just before this Article went to press.80 The
Plan is projected to reduce emissions from the power sector by 30 per-
cent relative to 2005 levels by 2030.81 Since about 32 percent of total
U.S. emissions are currently attributable to the power sector, the Plan
would result in a nearly 10 percent reduction in U.S. emissions over the
same time period, a substantial part of the President's stated emissions
goals.82
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130920proposalria.pdf
(noting that "[flor new sources, the EPA and other energy modeling groups such as EIA
do not project that any new coal capacity without federally-supported CCS will be built
in the analysis period").
78. See Dawn Reeves, EPA Considers 'Fallback Options'for Dropping CCS from
Power Plant NSPS, INSIDEEPA.cOM (2015), http://insideepa.com/login-redirect-no-
cookie?n=179275&destination--node/179275.
79. NSPS, supra note 71, at 1,446 ("We are proposing that all affected new fossil
fuel-fired EGUs are required to meet an output-based emission rate of a specific mass of
CO2 per MWh of useful output.").
80. See Alan Neuhauser, EPA to Issue Carbon Rules by Summer, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., (Jan. 7, 2015, 3:30 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/07/epa-to-complete-clean-power-plan-
carbon-rules-by-summer (noting that Janet McCabe, acting assistant administrator for
EPA's Office of Air and Radiation, announced in a call with reports that ESPS will be
finalized by "mid-summer 2015").
81. See CPP, supra note 3, at 34,832.
82. In 2009, President Obama's set emissions-reduction goals for the US "in the
range of" 17% reductions from 2005 levels by 2020. See Darren Samuelsohn and Lisa
Friedman, Obama Announces 2020 Emissions Target, Dec. 9 Copenhagen Visit, NY
TIMES (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/l1/25/25climatewire-
obama-announces-2020-emissions-target-dec-9-22088.html. In 2014, the President an-
nounced further goals of 26-28% reductions from 2005 levels by 2025 in a bilateral
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Under the Plan, the EPA will require states to limit carbon emis-
sions from most fossil-fuel power plants using its authority un-
der § 111 (d). In simplest terms, the agency has proposed performance
targets independently for each state based on four "Building Blocks" (de-
scribed below).83 States must then submit plans to the EPA for approval
detailing how sources in the state will meet that target. The Plan (like all
§ 11 1 (d) regulations, as described above), therefore, puts the EPA in the
role of making an initial stringency determination and states in the role of
implementation and regulatory design. The EPA's role is somewhat
broader in practice. The proposed rule, for example, makes a variety of
suggestions and assumptions regarding states' implementation, including
discussion of emissions trading.s* The EPA also, as described above, has
backstop regulatory authority if states fail to submit adequate plans. The
agency has also promised to include a model plan along with the final
rulemaking.85
The state goals set by the EPA are stated in terms of emission rates
(lbs of CO2 per megawatt-hour of generation), and each state is given
two goals-an interim goal that must be met on average between 2020
and 2029 and a final goal that must be met in 2030.86 The EPA deter-
mined goals for each state based on four Building Blocks, each encom-
passing different types of emissions-cutting actions that the agency has
concluded are possible. The four building blocks are: (1) efficiency im-
provements at existing power plants; (2) increased use of lower-emitting
gas plants (primarily at the expense of coal); (3) increased use of renew-
able generation; and (4) increased end-user nergy efficiency.87
agreement with China. See FACT SHEET: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate
Change and Clean Energy Cooperation, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (November 11, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-
announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c.
83. CPP, supra note 3.
84. Id. at 34,833 (stating that "[w]hile this proposal lays out state-specific CO2 goals
that each state is required to meet, it does not prescribe how a state should meet its goal.
CAA section 111 (d) creates a partnership between the EPA and the states under which
the EPA sets these goals and the states take the lead on meeting them by creating plans
that are consistent with the EPA guidelines. Each state will have the flexibility to design a
program to meet its goal in a manner that reflects its particular circumstances and energy
and environmental policy objectives"). See also infra Section 0 for detailed discussion of
trading under the CPP.
85. See EPA, Clean Power Plan Supplemental Proposal, (Jan. 7, 2015), http://
www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/clean-power-plan-supplemental-proposal
(noting that "EPA announced it will finalize the proposed Clean Power Plan by mid-
summer 2015. In addition, the agency will begin the regulatory process for proposing a
federal plan"). It is not immediately clear if this EPA plan is intended as a model for
states to emulate, a preview of what a federal plan would look like in the event states fail
to act, or both.
86. CPP, supra note 3, at 34,837.
87. Id. at 34, 836.
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It is important to remember that the Plan is still a set of performance
standards, not command-and-control regulation. The EPA used these
four Building Blocks to calculate the emissions reductions (or, more ac-
curately, emissions rate reductions) that it believes are achievable in
each state and to set goals accordingly. But states are not required to use
all (or, indeed, any) of these approaches in reducing emissions from reg-
ulated sources in the state. The EPA has also proposed allowing states to
convert their emissions rate goal (stated in lbs/CO2 per MWh) into a pure
emissions or mass goal (stated in lbs of C0 2) granting states even more
flexibility in achieving the goals.88
Under the proposed Plan, states are charged with submitting state
plans for EPA approval by mid-2017 (or mid-2018 if they are collaborat-
ing with other states on a multi-state plan, presumably involving regional
emissions trading).89
In early 2015, EPA announced its intention to release a federal plan
document in the summer of 2015, at the same time as the Plan is set to be
finalized.90 It is not clear whether this federal plan is intended to be a
model for state plans, a preview of what federal implementation in the
event of state failure to act would look like, or both.
IV. TRADING-AND WHY IT MATTERS
The Clean Power Plan deviates from the relatively few past EPA
§ 111 (d) regulatory programs in two important respects. The first is its
scope-the electric power sector is arguably the most environmentally
and economically significant sector subject to significant EPA regula-
tion. The Plan will subject existing power plants to carbon regulation for
the first time and likely will result in significant shifts in the sector, with
large associated costs. Past § 11 (d) regulations have focused on much
smaller sectors, such as municipal waste combustors.9' As noted above,
this section of the statute has not been used nearly as extensively and
frequently as other CAA authority, including regulations under the
§§ 108-110 national ambient air quality standards program, § 202 vehi-
cle regulations (including fuel economy standards), or even § 11 (b) new
source performance standards.
Second, the Plan envisions emissions trading among regulated
sources. Though the decision of whether to allow trading is ultimately
left to states, the Building Blocks that make up the EPA's stringency de-
termination, its encouragement to states to develop multi-state plans, and
88. Id. at 34, 850-51.
89. Id. at 34, 851.
90. See EPA, supra note 85.
91. See, e.g., EPA, Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emis-
sion Guidelines for Existing Sources: Large Municipal Waste Combustors, 71 Fed. Reg.
27,324, 27,324 (May 10, 2006).
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other discussion in the proposed Plan make it clear that the agency ex-
pects some, if not all, states to allow emitters to trade with each other.
This is a break from past practice under § 111. No NSPS allows for
emissions trading (and, as the next section discusses, such trading is like-
ly illegal or at least impractical). Similarly, there is almost no precedent
for trading in the few past ESPS programs. As also discussed in the next
section, the only two examples are an aborted program rejected by courts
on unrelated grounds and a small trading system for municipal waste
combustors that has never been challenged in court and which derives its
authority from multiple provisions of the CAA.
These two breaks with regulatory tradition-ESPS for a major sec-
tor of the economy and allowing trading in an ESPS program-are inter-
twined. The size and character of the electric power sector makes emis-
sions trading an extremely valuable tool for reducing the costs of
emissions reduction. Without trading, costs will likely be so great that
that the EPA's targets are rendered practically and politically realistic.
The success of the Clean Power Plan in anything like its current form
and ambition depends on emissions trading.
A. Trading Under the Clean Power Plan
In its proposed NSPS for power-sector GHGs, the EPA does not
propose to allow any form of trading among regulated facilities. But the
proposed ESPS-the Clean Power Plan-do envision trading. To be
clear, the EPA's proposed Plan does not require emissions trading or
even say much about how it would work in practice. Officially, the deci-
sion over whether and how to allow trading is left to the states. But the
EPA does explicitly state in the Plan that it believes states may allow
trading, and components of the plan make it clear that the EPA expects
them to do so.
In the Plan, the EPA states that,
[t]o meet its goal, each state will be able to design programs
that use the measures it selects, and these may include the
combination of building blocks most relevant o its specific
circumstances and policy preferences. States may also identify
technologies or strategies that are not explicitly mentioned in
any of the four building blocks and may use those technologies
or strategies as part of their overall plans (e.g., market-based
trading programs or construction of new natural combined cy-
cle units or nuclear plants). Further, the EPA's approach allows
multi-state compliance strategies.
92
92. CPP, supra note 3, at 34, 837 (emphasis added).
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In other words, the EPA views market-based trading as an option availa-
ble to states for compliance with the Plan, including interstate trading.
Furthermore, the EPA's building blocks themselves each imply
states attempting to achieve them will use emissions trading to do so. To
be clear, states are not required to achieve what he EPA projects in each
or any Building Block, but the building blocks do indicate at least the
kind of compliance strategies the EPA believes states will, or at least
may, take.
Building Block 1 is stated in the form of a 6 percent average heat
rate improvement across all coal-fired power plants.93 It is extremely un-
likely that each coal plant could meet this requirement even if it is
achievable across the fleet as a whole.94 In principle, a state could im-
pose plant-specific goals that would result in the 6 percent average im-
provement, but doing so would be extremely technically and administra-
tively difficult. To do so, states would have to determine the efficiency
improvements available at a target cost for each plant or class of plants, a
difficult task for plant owners, much less regulators. A tradable perfor-
mance standard, in which coal plants exceeding the target may trade
credits to other plants that fail to meet it, would be much simpler.95
Similarly, the shift from coal to gas generation envisioned under
Building Block 2 would likely be much easier to achieve via trading of
93. Id. at 34, 860.
94. Many analysts have concluded that even a 6% average goal is unrealistically am-
bitious. See, e.g., PACE GLOBAL, EPA's CLEAN POWER PLAN: ADDRESSING KEY QUES-
TIONS 2 (2014), http://www.paceglobal.com/bdpictures/091714CarbonWebinar/Pace_
GlobalEPAsCleanPowerPlan_WP.pdf (characterizing the 6% goal as "aggres-
sive" and suggesting that 1-3% reductions would be "more realistic"); NERA ECONOMIC
CONSULTING, POTENTIAL ENERGY IMPACTS OF THE EPA PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN 12
(2014), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2014/NERA ACCCE CPP
Final_10.17.2014.pdf ( "In its calculations of state targets, EPA assumed that all-coal
units could achieve a 6% improvement in their efficiency (i.e., reduction in heat rate), and
in its cost modeling EPA also assumed this 6% improvement could be achieved at a capi-
tal cost of $100/kilowatt (kW). We understand that various industry experts have con-
cluded that these assumptions are unrealistic in light of practical engineering considera-
tions, actual industry experience, and the incentives owners of electricity generators
already have to improve plant efficiency. Our clients suggested an alternative set of as-
sumptions, in particular, (a) for a cost of $1 00/kW, a maximum efficiency improvement
of 1.5% would be achievable for the most inefficient existing units and a 0.75% im-
provement would be available for units with average efficiency, and (b) no efficiency im-
provements would be available to the most efficient units."). But see BURTRAW ET AL.,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, COMMENTS TO THE US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY ON ITS PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN 5 (2014),
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-Rpt-CPPComments.pdf (stating that ". . .the
evidence suggests EPA's finding that a 6 percent reduction in heat rate from 2012 levels
is technically plausible and economically reasonable-given that the agency adopts a
flexible approach to achieve compliance"; according to the author, "flexible" in this con-
text means emissions reductions from greater utilization of more efficient units).
95. See generally Dallas Burtraw, Art Fraas, & Nathan Richardson, Tradable Stand-
ards for Clean Air Act Carbon Policy, 42 ELR 10338 (2012).
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emissions credits between coal and gas plants than it would through state
command-and-control decisions over power dispatch and plant operation,
at least outside of very small states with only a few plants.
The increased renewable generation and demand-side energy effi-
ciency envisioned by Building Blocks 3 and 4 would very likely also in-
volve some type of trading system so that the emissions reductions
achieved by renewable and efficiency projects could be attributed to fos-
sil power plants actually regulated under the Plan. Without such a sys-
tem, individual regulated plants would be required to independently in-
vest in such projects despite the fact that opportunities for such projects
likely differ widely. As noted above, however, this paper focuses on
trading among regulated emitters (in the case of the Plan, fossil power
plants) rather than how off-site projects like those in Building Blocks 3
and 4 are credited. See Section VI.C for more discussion of how renew-
ables and energy efficiency might be treated legally.
In practice, separate trading systems aimed at achieving each Build-
ing Block (or other goals selected by states in their plans) could be re-
placed with a general emissions trading system across all regulated
sources. Such a system would presumably be more cost-effective since it
would include a broader range of emissions-reduction opportunities.
Under such a system, the mix of actions taken by emitters to achieve the
target state emissions rate could include emissions improvements at coal
plants, shifts in generation from coal to gas, or other options. Individual
emitters would take such actions in proportion to their relative costs-
costs that regulators need not know in advance.
The EPA's regulatory impact analysis of the Clean Power Plan en-
visions such a general trading system. It assumes that state plans would,
in essence, adopt a simple tradable performance standard and "allow
[]averaging of emissions rates within each individual state"- perhaps
with some innovative elements such as inter-year trading:
All compliance scenarios modeled include an assumption that
affected sources within states are able to meet state goals col-
lectively, by averaging all of their emissions relative to all of
their generation. This approach enables some sources to emit at
rates higher than the relevant goal, as long as there is corre-
sponding generation coming from sources that emit at a lower
rate such that the goal (in lbs/MWh) is met across all affected
sources collectively. The average emissions rate at covered
sources must be less than or equal to the applicable state goal,
on average, over the entire compliance period, but not in any
particular year.
96
96. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED CARBON POLLUTION
GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS AND EMISSION STANDARDS FOR MODIFIED AND
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It also includes analysis of an alternative scenario involving inter-
state trading.97 In other words, the EPA assumed that, when determining
the proposed Plan's cost and balancing those costs against climate and
other benefits, states would allow trading (though the EPA is clear that
implementation decisions are ultimately up to states). The RIA does not
include an alternative scenario in which each regulated source must in-
dependently meet performance standards.
This evidence from the Clean Power Plan proposal and RIA indi-
cates that the EPA believes emissions trading among regulated sources is
legal, likely to be pursued by states, and crucial to the balance of costs
and benefits assumed by the agency in crafting the proposal.
B. Why Trading Matters
This assumption that trading is important to cost-effectiveness is not
surprising and is supported by external research examining the Plan pro-
posal.
The simple reason is that flexibility reduces costs. Economists have
long recognized that if (as is usually the case) emissions reduction costs
among a class of emitters are heterogeneous, it is more cost-effective for
those emitters with lower abatement costs to reduce emissions more than
those with higher abatement costs. In principle, regulators could capture
these efficiency improvements by assigning emitters different targets
based on their abatement costs-strict targets for those with low abate-
ment costs and lenient targets (or even no regulation at all) for those with
high costs. But such an approach requires the regulator to have good in-
formation about abatement costs or to expend significant resources de-
termining those costs. Market-based regulation, such as emissions trad-
ing, allows the efficiency benefits of heterogeneous abatement to be
achieved without assuming any regulator knowledge of abatement costs
for individual emitters. Under such a system, emitters with low abate-
ment costs can over-comply with targets and then trade that over compli-
ance (in the form of allowances or credits) to other sources with higher
abatement costs that under-comply.
Trading systems have a history of success and cost-effectiveness,
with many such programs having been implemented under Clean Air Act
authority-most notably the Title IV SO2 (acid rain) trading program and
the NOx Budget Program.
RECONSTRUCTED POWER PLANTS, EPA-452/R-14-002, at 3-10 (June 2014),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602ria-clean-
power-plan.pdf.
97. Id. at 3-9.
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1. Empirical Analyses of Trading in the Coal Sector
Although most research on the implications of trading for Clean Air
Act regulation of power-sector GHG emissions precedes the EPA's 2014
CPP proposal, it nevertheless offers strong evidence that rading allows
for significant cost reductions relative to a similarly stringent policy that
does not allow trading, or significantly greater emissions reductions rela-
tive to a policy with similar costs.
In a 2011 paper, researchers at Resources for the Future (RFF)
compared inflexible and flexible (i.e., allowing trading) performance
standards applying only to coal plant GHG emissions.9 8 The two policies
were calibrated to achieve the same total emissions reductions by 2020.
In their analysis, overall costs of a flexible standard were only about one-
third of those of the inflexible standard.99 Moreover, the inflexible
standard would lead to more than twice as large an increase in consumer
electricity prices relative to the flexible standard.'0 0 Other RFF research
comparing flexible and inflexible performance standards for the coal
power sector shows even greater cost-effectiveness advantages for flexi-
bility-more than eight times greater annualized costs under an inflexi-
ble policy relative to a similarly stringent flexible policy.' 01
2. The Coal-Gas Margin
It is worth reiterating that these analyses focus only on coal
plants-any further reduction in emissions reduction costs from trading
between coal and gas plants is not included. And there is good evidence
that shifting generation from coal to gas-rather than improving effi-
ciency or other measures at coal plants alone-is the largest, cheapest
opportunity for emissions reductions in the power sector. Preliminary
analysis of projected emissions reductions under the proposed Clean
Power Plan indicates that Building Block 2-increased utilization of gas
generation at the expense of coal-will result in the largest emissions re-
ductions of any of the four building blocks.102 Also, analysis of projected
emissions under a carbon tax indicates that, at least for modest tax rates,
switching from coal to gas generation is the largest single source of
98. DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, RETAIL ELECTRICITY
PRICE SAVINGS FROM COMPLIANCE FLEXIBILITY IN GHG STANDARDS FOR STATIONARY
SOURCES 1-2 (2011), http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP- 11-30.pdf.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id.
101. JOSH LINN ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, REGULATING GREENHOUSE
GASES FROM COAL POWER PLANTS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 54 (2013),
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP- 13-05.pdf.
102. See Anthony Paul & Sophie Pan, EPA's Clean Power Plan: Breaking Down the
Building Blocks, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (July 22, 2014), http://common-
resources.org/2014/epas-clean-power-plan-breaking-down-the-building-blocks/.
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emissions reductions from the electric power sector (or in some cases,
the second-largest after demand reductions). Because under a tax, all
emitters should, in theory, reduce emissions up to (and only up to) the
point at which further reductions would be more costly than paying the
tax, this indicates that there is a very large pool of relatively low-cost
emissions reductions available from coal-gas switching.10 3 (This is no
longer the case at very high carbon tax levels since gas generation begins
to lose out to renewables and other zero-emitting technologies.)
This evidence for a relatively low-cost margin between coal and gas
is supported by "secular" trends in the U.S. generation mix-that is,
changes independent of climate or other environmental policy. In recent
years, natural gas generation has substantially increased at the expense of
coal, in large part due to declines in the price of natural gas.104 There is
some evidence that these secular trends may have had greater impact on
the generation mix and electricity prices than non-climate environmental
policy.10 5 The Clean Power Plan will put further pressure on this margin.
Because of the fragility of this coal-gas margin and the apparently
large emissions reductions available at relatively low cost from coal-gas
switching, a trading program allowing coal and gas generators to trade
with each other is likely to yield even greater cost-effectiveness than the
coal-only trading approaches studied in earlier modeling analyses. Given
the large (three- to eight-fold) cost reductions estimated for coal-only
trading, the cost-effectiveness advantages for a trading system encom-
passing all fossil generation regulated under the CPP are likely to be very
large. Conversely, if the EPA's approach in setting program stringency
is to achieve the maximum emissions reductions possible at some fixed
social cost, a broad trading system would allow far greater emissions re-
ductions at the same cost relative to an inflexible approach. From this
perspective, foregoing trading would substantially diminish the environ-
mental benefits of the CPP.
3. Distribution, Costs, and Benefits
There is also evidence that trading can smooth distributional and
geographic impacts of power sector ESPS. Research by Etan Gumerman
of Duke University's Nicholas Institute indicates that allowing trading
under ESPS would result in fewer retirements of coal plants than under
103. See PAUL ET AL., supra note 15, at 22.
104. See Karen Palmer, Cheap Gas - Not EPA Regs - Driving Coal's Decline,
THE BREAKTHROUGH (2012), http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/programs/energy-and-
climate/more-gas-less-coal-cheaper-power (describing economic research attributing
much of the coal-gas shift in the US power generation mix to falling natural gas prices).
105. See DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, SECULAR TRENDS,




an inflexible approach of similar stringency and would "alleviate[] con-
centrated impacts in heavy-retirement regions.'10 6 This is because plants
that would otherwise be unable to meet stringent plant-specific perfor-
mance standards could purchase credits from other emitters that over
comply.
Collectively, this evidence indicates that whether trading is availa-
ble under ESPS-that is, whether it is legally permissible and, if so,
whether states allow it-is likely to be the single most important deter-
minant of the Clean Power Plan's cost and environmental effectiveness.
If trading is available, it appears possible to achieve the EPA's environ-
mental goals at relatively modest cost relative to benefits. While there is
some debate over the EPA's benefit and cost estimates, the agency's
Regulatory Impact Analysis estimates the CPP's annual benefits to be
between $55 and $93 billion in 2030, compared with annual costs of $7.3
to $8.8 billion.10 7 But remember that these estimates assume trading is
available. If it is not, costs will be much higher-perhaps more than
eight times higher, based on past analyses, though specific empirical
analysis of the CPP is not yet available.
Such high costs would dramatically increase (already strong) politi-
cal opposition to the program and would likely force the agency to re-
consider the plan as currently proposed, reducing its environmental am-
bition or even scrapping it entirely.
Given the importance of trading to power-sector GHG regulation,
the following sections consider whether such trading is legal under § 11l
of the Clean Air Act, beginning with new and proceeding to existing
sources.
V. NEW SOURCES AND TRADING
Does § 111 give regulators authority to allow sources subject to per-
formance standards to use flexible compliance options? More specifical-
ly, can these sources trade with each other such that the average emis-
sions performance of a group of sources meets the standard?
Traditionally, under § 111 performance standards, the answer has
been no. Until its recent ESPS proposal, almost all of the EPA's past
§ 111 performance standards for various source categories and pollutants
have required each individual regulated source to comply with the stated
standard-that is, no trading or other compliance flexibility has been
106. See JEREMY M. TARR ET AL., DUKE NICHOLAS INSTITUTE, REGULATING CARBON
DIOXIDE UNDER SECTION 111(D) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: OPTIONS, LIMITS, & IMPACTS 9
(2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni r 13-01 .pdf.
107. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED CARBON POLLUTION
GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS & EMISSION STANDARDS FOR MODIFIED & RE-
CONSTRUCTED POWER PLANTS, supra note 96, at ES- 19.
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permitted.10 8 This is not merely historical precedent-as noted above the
agency's proposed power-sector NSPS does not allow trading.
Almost all of these past regulations have been NSPS, not ESPS,
however. There are a variety of legal and practical reasons for this past
practice that may or may not apply to the present ESPS context.
A. A Statutory Barrier?
First, the text of § 111 itself may forbid trading for new sources.
Section 111 (e) reads:
After the effective date of standards of performance promul-
gated under this section, it shall be unlawful for any owner or
operator of any new source to operate such source in violation
of any standard of performance applicable to such source.'0 9
One interpretation of this provision, and perhaps the most obvious one, is
that it requires each individual source to comply with applicable NSPS
and forbids averaging among sources. To illustrate why, imagine two
new sources under construction in a category subject to an NSPS. If av-
eraging were allowed, one source (presumably with low-cost emissions
reduction opportunities available) would be constructed so as to emit at a
lower rate than required by the standard, while the other (presumably
with high emissions reduction costs) would be constructed so that its
emissions rate would exceed the standard. The average emissions across
both sources, however, would meet or exceed the standard."0 However,
the source with an emissions rate greater than that specified by the stand-
ard would arguably be operating in violation of § 111 (f).
This is not, however, the only plausible interpretation of § 11 1(f). It
is based on an assumption that "standard of performance" refers only to
the set emissions rate. If "standard of performance" is instead taken to
mean the entire regulatory scheme (including provisions allowing aver-
aging), then greater-emitting source(s) in a group with average emissions
that meet the standard would not be in violation of it, as forbidden by
§ 111(f).
108. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60.5015(a)(3) (2014) (directing states to include
"[c]ompliance schedules for each affected SSI unit" in plans submitted to EPA for ap-
proval). EPA has allowed trading in one ESPS program, and one other proposed program,
as discussed in Section 0 below, but none of the few other ESPS or many other NSPS
have allowed trading.
109. Clean Air Act § 11 l(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(e) (2012).
110. In practice, such averaging might occur across units owned by the same firm, or
it might involve a tradable emissions credit. For detailed discussion of such a "tradable
performance standard," see Burtraw et al, supra note 95.
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B. The ASARCO Decision
A separate legal reason why trading has not been available under
NSPS is that early attempts by the EPA to allow it--or at least something
similar-were rejected in 1978 by the D.C. Circuit in ASARCO v. EPA.
111 This decision, however, may no longer be good law, and, even if it is,
it likely applies only to new and not existing sources. In fact, if you view
pre-Chevron decisions involving agency interpretation of statues as im-
mediately suspect, you can skip to the end of this section. If not, a re-
view of the decision and its implications is worthwhile.
In the late 1970s, the EPA-under pressure from industry'1z -
issued general regulations governing the applicability of NSPS that in-
cluded a "bubbling" approach.'13 Recall that NSPS apply to both new
and modified sources, with the latter defined in § 11 (a) as those sources
which undergo a "physical change" or "change in the method of opera-
tion" that "increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted ... or results
in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted."',14 Under a
bubbling approach, sources that undergo a modification that increases
emissions, but which reduce their emissions elsewhere at the same loca-
tion (i.e., under the "bubble") such that there is no net emissions in-
crease, are not subject to NSPS. In other words, bubbling would allow
an existing plant to avoid modified-source NSPS by averaging its emis-
sions across multiple facilities within the plant.115 The EPA could have
extended this approach to include new sources constructed at the same
physical location as existing sources, excluding them from NSPS as well
if other sources at the plant reduced their emissions. Although industry
pressured the agency to so extend the bubbling approach, it did not do
so.116
Environmental groups challenged the EPA's regulations containing
the bubbling approach, and the D.C. Circuit decided in their favor in
ASARCO.117 Judge Skelly-Wright, writing for the unanimous panel,
ruled that bubbling was incompatible with the definition of "stationary
source" in § 11 l(a)(3) as "any building, structure, facility, or installa-
tion."18 Moreover, the court ruled that exempting modified sources that
merely maintain current emissions levels from NSPS via bubbling was
inconsistent with the CAA's overall purpose of reducing emissions over
111. See ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
112. Id. at 323-24.
113. Id. at 321-22.
114. Clean Air Act § 11 1(a)(4).
115. ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 321-22.
116. Id. at 323-24.
117. Id. at 329-30.
118. Id.
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time rather than merely maintaining them. 119 Essentially, ASARCO's
holding is that the statutorily-mandated unit of compliance for § 111 per-
formance standards is the "source," and that that term should be con-
strued narrowly.
As a result of ASARCO, the EPA abandoned its bubbling approach
for modified-source NSPS and did not expand it to new sources as indus-
try had urged. The agency has not revisited the issue since. If ASARCO
remains good law and applies to § 11 (d) ESPS as well as the § 11 l(b)
NSPS at issue in the case, it almost certainly forbids averaging and trad-
ing across entire source categories, as envisioned under the proposed
power sector ESPS.
However, there are strong arguments that ASARCO is inapplicable
to the ESPS or is no longer good law. First, ASARCO concerns NSPS
(specifically, modified-source NSPS), not ESPS. It could be argued that
§ 111 (d) ESPS are a separate statutory scheme to which ASARCO's rea-
soning should not necessarily apply. This, however, is not a particularly
strong argument. Section 111 (d) of ESPS depends on the same statutory
definitions as NSPS, including the § I11 (a)(4) definition of "stationary
source," interpreted narrowly by the ASARCO court. It is perhaps rea-
sonable to conclude that ASARCO's appeal to a general statutory goal of
ever-declining emissions is weaker in the existing-source context, but re-
call that the EPA regulation at issue in ASARCO itself concerned existing
sources-the issue was when and whether such sources would be subject
to modified-source NSPS. If the CAA can be interpreted to have a gen-
eral goal of decreasing emissions from existing sources when they un-
dergo modification, it is difficult to argue that goal disappears when the
same sources are subject to § 111 (d) ESPS.
A second and somewhat better argument is that ASARCO's narrow
interpretation of "source" only applies to the threshold question of
whether an emitter is subject to performance standards. Whether sources
subject to performance standards may trade among themselves to achieve
the standards is a different question not addressed in ASARCO. Emis-
sions will decrease among sources subject to standards, at least in the ag-
gregate and on average, so the ASARCO court's concerns that perfor-
mance standards result in emissions reductions, and not just maintenance
of current levels, are not implicated as they are in the threshold applica-
bility context.
Nevertheless, the court's narrow definition of "stationary source"
may remain an obstacle, but perhaps not an insurmountable one. Just as
with the § 11 1(f) requirement discussed above, a source that exceeds an
emissions standard but averages its emissions with another over comply-
ing source is arguably in compliance with the performance standard, so
119. Id. at 327.
[Vol. 120:1
TRADING UNMOORED:
long as that standard is understood to refer to the entire regulatory
scheme and not just the stated emissions rate. If so, no reinterpretation
of the definition of "stationary source" is required.
Alternatively, it may not be necessary to argue that ASARCO is in-
applicable to ESPS since the decision may no longer be good law.
ASARCO's scope was narrowed by a subsequent D.C. Circuit decision,
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, in which the court held that a similar bub-
bling approach was legal in the NSR context.12° Moreover, ASARCO
may have been implicitly overruled by either the specific or general
holding of the well-known Chevron v. NRDC decision.12 1 In Chevron,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld another similar bubbling approach in the
NSR context, overturning the D.C. Circuit.122 While it does not do so
explicitly, Chevron can be interpreted to have overruled the D.C. Cir-
cuit's decisions rejecting bubbling under various CAA provisions, in-
cluding § 11 1 in ASARCO in that it authorizes flexible interpretations of
the stationary source definition in § 1 1 (a)(4).
123
More generally, Chevron has heralded an era of increased deference
to agency interpretations of law under its familiar framework. Under
Chevron, if the § I II(a)(4) definition of "stationary source" at issue in
ASARCO is ambiguous (as Chevron itself suggests that it is) and the
EPA's interpretation is reasonable, a court deciding ASARCO today
would be required to defer to that interpretation. Even if ASARCO does
bar trading under § 111 performance standards, therefore, it appears like-
ly that a contrary interpretation by the EPA today would receive much
greater deference from a reviewing court.
For these reasons, while ASARCO can largely explain the unavaila-
bility of trading in past § 111 performance standards, it likely does not
restrict the availability of such flexibility in GHG ESPS. One cannot be
certain, however-ASARCO does create legal risk for trading approaches
under § 111 (d) ESPS, and it is a minor surprise that the case is not dis-
cussed in the Clean Power Plan proposal.
C. Practical Barriers
Returning to the new source context, even if neither § 111 (f) nor the
ASARCO case create legal barriers to trading among new sources, signif-
icant and probably insurmountable practical barriers still exist.
First, trading is only useful if sources are heterogeneous. If all new
sources have similar emissions performance and/or abatement costs, then
there is nothing to be gained from trading. While local conditions and
120. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
121. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
122. Id. at 866.
123. See id.
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technologies may lead to some differences among new plants, these dif-
ferences are likely to be smaller than those among existing plants. It is
simply not clear what trading partners new sources would have, and
therefore, what market for tradable credits would exist.
Second, new sources are required to undergo New Source Review
(NSR), a separate CAA process not directly related to the NSPS.124 Un-
der NSR, new (or modified) sources undergo case-by-case review and
must demonstrate that they employ "best available control technology,"
or BACT, for pollutants regulated under the CAA. 125 Even if NSPS were
flexible by allowing new facilities to meet standards on average (by trad-
ing) rather than individually, NSR would still require each new facility to
demonstrate BACT. The result would be relatively similar emissions
performance and abatement costs among new sources. Put simply, NSR
requirements mean that building a relatively dirty new facility and plan-
ning to buy tradable emissions credits from cleaner new emitters is not
possible. Such a facility would fail to demonstrate BACT and could not
be constructed. And since NSR is a case-by-case review, no parallel
trading system could be set up under that program.
Looking at the power sector as a whole, it might be possible for rel-
atively clean new sources to be sellers of credits in a broader trading sys-
tem that includes existing sources, but the requirement of NSR compli-
ance (as well as the legal barriers discussed above) means that they could
not be net buyers of credits from existing sources or other new sources.
Even if new sources are only credit sellers, it is unclear whether new and
existing sources could be part of the same trading market. They are
regulated under separate programs under separate parts of the Act (the
NSPS and ESPS), and the ASARCO decision could prevent any new
source trading.
However, the EPA could likely resolve this problem by treating
new sources as existing sources immediately or soon after construction,
thereby bringing them into any ESPS trading program. Traditionally,
new sources remain "new" rather than "existing" for CAA § 11 1 purpos-
es until ESPS are issued (or, if already present, next revised).126 This
practice is not surprising-since NSPS are stricter than ESPS, there
would be little point, assuming trading is not allowed, in subjecting a
new source to both standards until and unless the ESPS are revised, when
they might become more stringent than the earlier NSPS. But this is not
124. Clean Air Act §§ 160-193, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7515 (2012).
125. Id. at § 165(a)(4).
126. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60.1505 (2014) (defining "existing" sources covered un-
der one ESPS program as those constructed before August 30, 1999, a few months before
the relevant rule was finalized; any source constructed after that date would be subject to
NSPS, but not ESPS-at least until and unless new ESPS were finalized, with an updated
cutoff date for existing sources).
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required by the statute-the CAA does not explicitly indicate when new
sources become existing sources. The EPA could presumably, therefore,
change its traditional practice in this regard. If it did so, new sources
could be directly incorporated into a trading program (though it would
still not be possible to build a new source that failed to meet the NSPS or
NSR BACT standards).
VI. EXISTING SOURCES-TRADING AND THE "BEST SYSTEM OF
EMISSION REDUCTION"
Just because trading appears illegal or at least impractical for new
sources under § 111 (b) NSPS does not necessarily mean, however, that
trading is unavailable among existing sources under § 11 1 (d) ESPS. This
is because many of the arguments against new source trading do not ap-
ply. Section 11 l(e), forbidding operation of sources violating NSPS, ex-
plicitly refers only to new sources."' Existing sources do not undergo
new source review unless they commence a major modification, and oth-
er practical barriers to trading among new sources are not present either.
Moreover, as discussed above, the ASARCO decision barring trading
may not apply to ESPS even if it remains good law in the NSPS context.
Whether trading is available under § 11 (d) ESPS-and the Clean Power
Plan-is therefore a separate legal question that has never been decided
(or even, to my knowledge, litigated on the merits) by any court. It
would at least be an issue of first impression in the D.C. Circuit, where
any challenge would be heard. 
128
This question is therefore a rare bird-an almost completely new
(and important, given the significance of trading for costs under the CPP)
legal issue based on a decades-old statute. It has, perhaps unsurprisingly,
sparked heated debate. Many scholars and analysts have argued that, de-
spite lack of precedent, § 1 11 (d) gives the EPA and/or the states suffi-
cient authority to allow at least some forms of compliance flexibility, in-
cluding trading among sources and perhaps crediting of off-site projects.
A smaller number of scholars and analysts outside academia have made
opposing arguments. Since a court has never ruled on this issue, it is im-
possible to know for sure what view is correct (the views in this paper
included). Without relevant court precedent (outside of the ASARCO de-
cision discussed above), arguments must rely on interpretations of the
statutory text, other indicators of congressional intent, past agency prac-
tice, and other evidence that is fragmentary and/or subject to varied in-
terpretation.
127. Clean Air Act § 11 1(e).
128. Id. at § 307(b).
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A. Can States Do Whatever They Want?
Perhaps the simplest argument in favor of trading being available
under § 111(d) is worth discussing first. Section 111(d) ESPS differ
from the remainder of § 111 in that they explicitly delegate to states the
role of primary regulator. As discussed above, states must submit plans
to EPA describing their planned regulation, but are directly responsible
for implementation and enforcement. Does this therefore mean that
whether trading is available under ESPS is a question of state law, not
federal? Can't states do whatever they like, limited only by state or fed-
eral constitutional boundaries and the politics of their own legislature?
In other words, if a state wants to implement a trading program under
§ 111 (d), this argument goes, doesn't the CAA delegate that decision to
the state?129
This argument is tempting for CAA scholars and certainly for states
since it punts legal debates over trading to states and lets them decide for
themselves, without federal court interference, whether they want to al-
low trading or not. Even if it is correct, it does not end the legal or poli-
cy inquiry-whether existing state law allows trading may be a difficult
legal question (or 50 separate questions), and whether a state could pass
new legislation allowing trading may be a difficult political question.
But as a matter of federal law, it means that trading would be legal or at
least not illegal.
However, this simple argument appears to be incorrect, or at least
incomplete. Section 11 (d) does not delegate unbounded authority to
states to regulate. Unlike the delegation of authority to states to regulate
under the § 110 NAAQS, states are restricted to a single policy tool (the
relationship between these two otherwise similar delegations to states
under the Act is discussed in detail in Section VI.G below). That policy
tool is "performance standards," defined in § 111 (and elsewhere in the
CAA). Section 1 11(d) requires states to submit to the EPA "a Plan
which. . . establishes standards of performance ... [and] provides for the
implementation and enforcement of such standards of performance."' 
30
A plan using some other policy tool that does not fit within the CAA def-
inition of "standards of performance" therefore does not meet § 111 (d)'s
requirements or, alternatively, the statute does not grant the EPA authori-
ty to approve such a plan.
This is not to say that § 111 (d) restricts state authority to impose the
environmental regulations of their choice. Nothing in § 111 (d), for ex-
ample, impedes California's state authority to implement its cap-and-
129. See, e.g., GREGORY E. WANNIER ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, PREVAIL-
ING ACADEMIC VIEW ON COMPLIANCE FLEXIBILITY UNDER § 111 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 4-
6(2011), http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-11-29.pdf.
130. Clean Air Act § 111 (d)(1).
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trade system. It does mean, however, that the federal statute determines
what state policy tools may be included in state § 111 (d) plans (or, again,
what such plans the EPA may approve). Specifically, the meaning of
"standard of performance" is controlling.
This interpretation of § 111 (d) is supported by its history. In its
original 1970 form, § 11 1(d) directed states to establish "emission stand-
ards" in their plans.'31 This term is not defined in § 111 or elsewhere in
the statute, and could plausibly be interpreted to have much broader
meaning--or at least to indicate congressional intent to make a different
set of policy tools available to states for ESPS than it gave EPA for
NSPS. However, in the 1977 CAA amendments, "emission standards"
was replaced by "standard of performance," thereby conforming § 111 (d)
to § 111 (b). 32 It is hard to interpret this change as anything other than an
indication that the same tool(s) should be available to states for ESPS as
available to EPA for NSPS, whatever the reason (if any) for the previous
distinction in terminology. If this reading is correct and states must use
performance standards, one is therefore left with a question of federal
law: Can a standard of performance, as defined in the CAA, include
trading among existing sources? This question, as noted, has been the
subject of significant contention.
B. Types of Flexibility-Where Does Trading Fit In?
Before exploring the arguments regarding ESPS trading made to
date, it is important to be specific about what's being debated. In a 2012
paper,13 1 I analyzed the legality of various flexible compliance options
potentially available under § 111 (d) ESPS and divided them into five
types or categories based on the distance (both physical and conceptual)
between the regulated emitter subject o the standards and the set of trad-
ing partners. For example, what I termed Type 1 flexibility refers to
trading with other sources in the same regulated source category-say,
two coal plants. Type 5 flexibility, in contrast, refers to emissions offsets
obtained by funding projects that sequester atmospheric carbon, such as
reforestation.
131. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 42, at 11097.
132. Id.
133. Nathan Richardson, Playing Without Aces: Offsets & the Limits of Flexibility
Under Clean Air Act Climate Policy, 42 ENVTL. L. 735 (2012).
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Figure 2: Tpes of Compliance .Fexi bili.)' 34
In the paper, I argued that § 1 11 is almost certainly incompatible
with Types 3-5 in this classification, generally due to the fact that these
options do not result in emissions reductions at sources regulated under
the Act (or, in the case of Type 5 flexibility, do not result in emissions
reductions at all). 135 Types 3-5, incompatible with § 111, include most
options commonly referred to as "offsets," like reforestation/avoided de-
forestation or reductions in emissions from foreign sources.
In contrast, I argued that Type 1 (trading among sources within the
same regulated source category) and Type 2 (trading among sources in
different regulated source categories) flexibility were at least plausibly
legal under § 111. This paper is essentially a deeper look at this ques-
tion: the compatibility of what I called Types 1 and 2 flexibility in the
2012 paper with § 111 (d) ESPS.
The trading options discussed and envisioned in the CPP fall into
these two types, with the significant addition in its third and fourth build-
ing blocks of credits for off-site projects (demand-side energy efficiency
134. Id. at 744.
135. Id. at 744-45.
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and new renewable generation) that reduce the need for fossil generation
and therefore regulated sources' GHG emissions.
C. A Note on Building Blocks 3 and 4: Energy Efficiency and
Renewables
I did not specifically analyze in my 2012 paper how and whether
such off-site projects fit within the legal constraints of § 111(d) ESPS,
and unfortunately, there is insufficient space to do so here in any detail.
Briefly, the simplest way to fit such projects into the compliance flexibil-
ity framework is to call them "Type Zero" flexibility. They are, perhaps
barely, a form of compliance flexibility in that they allow emitters regu-
lated under performance standards to use tools beyond the traditionally
available technological and work-practice changes to comply.
But unlike all of the other types of flexibility, they result in emis-
sions reductions at the facility itself, at least in theory and/or in part. For
example, reducing consumer electricity demand in an area served by a
particular power plant reduces the amount of time and/or intensity at
which that plant must run, with corresponding reductions in emissions.
Reality is, of course, much more complex. Emissions reductions that re-
sult from demand-side efficiency projects or renewable generation fund-
ed by a given utility may be difficult or impossible to apportion among
the utility's ESPS-regulated fossil power plants. Moreover, the emis-
sions reductions from any such project are unlikely in many cases to
come from even a single firm's fossil plants. The electric power system
is interconnected and interdependent. It is even possible that reductions
in generation would come from non-emitting sources not regulated under
the plan. Resolving these issues will require detailed ex ante modeling
and ex post monitoring.
Building Blocks 3 and 4 and the incentives they create for demand-
side energy efficiency and renewables are often characterized as EPA's
boldest step in the CPP. However, the close connection between such
tools and emissions reductions at regulated facilities themselves makes
them arguably more similar to the traditional technology and work-
practice tools than inter-facility trading is, at least in a legal sense. But
difficulties of measurement, verification, and attribution of emissions re-
ductions to specific regulated facilities may be significant practical barri-
ers and could create legal difficulties if courts conclude that the connec-
tion with specific regulated facilities is too tenuous. As noted above, the
discussion of trading in this paper is focused on trading among regulated
sources, not off-site projects envisioned under Building Blocks 3 and 4.
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D. The Trading Debate So Far
1. The Mainstream View-Trading Is Legal
Such trading among regulated facilities is Type 1 (or Type 2) flexi-
bility. As discussed above, I have argued in the past that trading is likely
legal under § 111 (d) ESPS. A number of other scholars and advocacy
groups share my initial optimism. Most of these arguments in favor of
trading under § 111 (d) focus on the § 111 (a) definition of "standard of
performance," and in particular its language requiring such standards to
"reflect" the "best system of emissions reduction." For example, one of
the first academic reviews of carbon policy options under the Clean Air
Act argued:
"Cap-and-trade can easily qualify as the 'best' system 'taking
into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any
nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy re-
quirements'... . Ultimately, some form of cap-and-trade will
fit under the statutory definition of 'standard of perfor-
mance."1
36
Further, a 2011 literature review by scholars from Resources
for the Future (including me) and legal scholars at New York and
Columbia Universities concluded that trading among sources was
likely legal.137 With respect to trading among sources in the same
source category, we argued at the time that the § 111 (a) definition
of performance standards is
[a]lmost certainly is broad enough to enable both [the] EPA
and states to incorporate compliance flexibility: using their
statutory discretion, those authorities can define many flexible
approaches as the most efficient (and therefore the 'best') sys-
tems for reducing emissions at the sector level. This discretion
to define statutory criteria is central to [the] EPA and states
ability to implement any flexibility mechanisms. 1
38
Moreover, the environmental group Natural Resources Defense
Council produced a comprehensive policy proposal for power-
sector ESPS in 2012 that included both trading and crediting of en-
ergy-efficiency projects, with accompanying legal analysis arguing
that both options are compatible with § 111 (d). That analysis ar-
gued that "nothing in the language of Section 111 limits the EPA to
considering measures implemented at the source itself when setting
standards or guidelines. The term 'best system of emission reduc-
136. Chettiar & Schwartz, supra note 57, at 88.
137. WANNIERETAL., supra note 129, at 8.
138. Id. at 4.
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tion' points toward a broader perspective" and that an approach in-
cluding trading makes ense given the structure of the electric pow-
er sector.
139
In the past, the EPA itself has used similar arguments as the legal
basis for trading under § 11 l(d) ESPS. In 2005, the agency proposed the
Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), which would have created a national
cap-and-trade program for mercury emissions from power plants.1 40 In
that rulemaking, the agency "interpret[ed] the term 'standard of perfor-
mance' as applied to existing sources, to include a cap-and-trade pro-
gram," in part because it determined cap-and-trade was the "best system
of emission reduction.' 141 CAMR was, however, vacated by the D.C.
Circuit on unrelated grounds. The EPA has allowed trading in one active
ESPS program, for municipal waste combustors.142 As discussed below,
however, this program may not provide much precedential value.
As also discussed in the next section, and in an apparent shift since
its position in the CAMR rulemaking, however, the EPA does not rely
heavily on the "best system of emission reduction" language in legal ar-
guments it makes in favor of trading in its proposed Clean Power Plan. 143
Summarizing these arguments, the current mainstream view among
scholars and analysts appears to be that trading among regulated sources
is permissible under § 111 (d) ESPS, at least in some form. Moreover,
the legal justification for this authority is widely understood to come
from the agency's conclusion that trading is the "best system of emission
reduction." In short, this standard interpretation says that ESPS may use
any "system of emission reduction" that the agency determines is "best"
based on the criteria specified in the statute. This is a broad grant of au-
thority based on broad language-the statute leaves it to the agency to
determine both what qualifies as a "system" and which such system is
"best".
139. DAVID DONIGER, NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL, QUESTIONS & AN-
SWERS ON THE EPA's LEGAL AUTHORITY TO SET "SYSTEM BASED" CARBON POLLUTION
STANDARDS FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS UNDER CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION 11 (D), at 5
(2013), http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution-standards/files/system-based-pollution-
standards-IB.pdf.
140. EPA, "Clean Air Mercury Rule", Standards of Performance for New and Exist-
ing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28, 606,
(May 18, 2005) (establishing nationwide cap-and-trade program for mercury emissions
under section 111 of the Clean Air Act).
141. Id. at 28, 616.
142. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the
CAMR rule on the grounds that EPA had improperly delisted mercury from § 112 of the
CAA).
143. See infra Section 0 and accompanying notes.
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2. Counterarguments-§ 111 Does Not Allow Trading
Support for this view, however, is not uniform. Many critics of the
CPP argue that § 111 limits compliance flexibility. These critics begin
by making a substantially narrower reading of the "best system" lan-
guage, arguing that it (at least alone) does not give the agency wide lati-
tude to choose the "best" among many regulatory approaches qualifying
as "systems." They then make broader precedential, textual, or intent ar-
guments against trading under § 111 (d).
For example, Jeff Holmstead, former EPA general counsel under
the George W. Bush administration and currently a private lawyer and
industry lobbyist, stated in 2014 Congressional testimony that
[the] EPA focuses on the word "system" and argues that a
"system" can involve many different things that all fit together,
like the electricity system in a state. But the statute does not
say that [the] EPA can regulate a "system." It says that [the]
EPA and the states are to set standards for emissions of air pol-
lutants based on the "application of the best system of emis-
sions reduction." The question is not what a "system" may be.
Rather, the question is the best system as "applied to what"?
[The] EPA says, "as applied to anything that produces or uses
electricity in the state." But the answer, according to the statute
and almost 40 years of regulatory history, is "as applied to the
individual sources within the source category being regulated."
In the context of Section 111(d), this means to "any existing
source," as long as, "in applying a standard of performance to
any particular source," the state is able to "take into considera-
tion, among other factors, the remaining useful life of the exist-
ing source to which such standard applies. 144
In short, therefore, the "best system" term, however broad, does not
grant regulators the authority to target the sector-wide or sector-average
emissions reduction goals implied by an approach that allows trading.
Opposition to trading under § 111 is not restricted to industry advo-
cates, however. Georgetown University law professor Lisa Heinzerling,
a well-known advocate of strong climate policy, argued in her 2004 pa-
per, written in response to the EPA's CAMR rulemaking, that cap-and-
trade (and presumably other forms of trading) were incompatible with
§ 111:
144. See EPA's Carbon Plan: Failure by Design: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on





The EPA argues that the language of § 11 l(a)(1), which refers
to the "best system of emissions reduction," gives it the power
to adopt a cap-and-trade program for mercury emissions from
power plants. [The] EPA is mistaken. Most notably, although
§ 111 was amended in 1990 to omit the requirement that § 111
limits reflect technological systems of emissions reduction, not
a peep was heard from Congress about the possibility that a
trading regime could be installed under § 111. This silence,
again, is significant in light of the fact that Congress was at
that very time enacting our first trading program, in Title IV of
the Act.
145
Professor Heinzerling reiterated these arguments in later congres-
sional testimony on § 111 carbon regulation in 2008, arguing that
"[§ 111] appears to require individual, technology-based requirements
for each individual facility, a requirement in considerable tension with a
cap-and-trade scheme.146
Heinzerling and Holmstead use different evidence and arguments to
reach their conclusion that trading is impermissible under § 111(d)-
Holmstead bases his argument on past EPA practice and an emitting-
facility focus he argues is evidenced by § 111 as a whole. Heinzerling
focuses on congressional intent. But both start with a rejection of the
"best system of emission reduction" language as the source of EPA au-
thority to allow trading. This is the heart of their disagreement with the
pro-trading view shared by most scholars and the EPA itself.
These competing understandings of how § 111-and in particular
the "best system of emission reduction" language-should be interpreted
have dominated debates over trading under the ESPS, which, as dis-
cussed above, is likely the single most important issue for the policy's
costs and environmental effectiveness.
E. The ESPS Two-Step
In my view, the advocates of flexibility make stronger arguments
regarding interpretation of the "best system" language-my views on
this subject have not changed since my 2011 and 2012 papers cited
above. However, the debate over whether the "best system" language
allows the EPA to set up a trading system is, I believe, beside the point,
despite all of the ink spilled to date. This is because the § 11 1(a)(1) defi-
145. Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury & the Bush
Administration, 34 ELR 10297, 10309 (2004).
146. Strengths & Weaknesses of Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Using Exist-
ing Clean Air Act Authorities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Air Quality of
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nition that includes the "best system" language does not and cannot re-
solve the question of whether regulated sources can actually trade with
each other. To see why, it is useful to look deeper at some industry crit-
ics' arguments against the CPP (and a response to those arguments).
Some of these critics argue that, even if the statute does not grant
the agency authority to consider trading and other forms of flexibility in
setting standards, it does not necessarily block sources subject to those
standards from using such tools to comply. In other words, they argue
that the EPA must ignore the cost savings associated with trading when
balancing the criteria it is directed to consider in setting standards, but
sources can still take advantage of those savings once the standard is
set.147 This view may seem self-serving and/or hypocritical, but it in fact
identifies crucial elements of § 111 's structure with major effects on its
interpretation, as we shall soon see.
Kate Konschnik and Ari Peskoe of Harvard Law School confront
and ultimately reject these critics' arguments in a 2014 paper, arguing in
favor of a "symmetry principle" they say is implied by the text of § 111
and relevant case law.148  Under this symmetry principle, the statute
should be interpreted to require regulators to look ahead and consider
compliance options available to emitters when they set the standards'
stringency. The symmetry comes from the fact that regulators' inability
to consider options unavailable to emitters is a well-understood and fair-
ly obvious result of the statutory language.1
49
147. See, e.g., David Roberts, Obama's Carbon Rule Hangs on this One Legal
Question, GRIST.ORG (Feb. 9, 2015), http://grist.org/climate-energy/obamas-carbon-rule-
hangs-on-this-one-legal-question/ (stating, in what admittedly amounts to hearsay, that
"[c]onservatives argue that power producers should have a wide array of compliance op-
tions, so that there's flexibility and lower costs, but that the full array of compliance op-
tions shouldn't be taken into account when setting the performance standard, only within-
the-fenceline stuff'). Jeffrey Holmstead, former EPA Assistant Administrator for Air and
Radiation argues that "EPA is supposed to provide states with guidance about what con-
stitute[s] the best system of emission reduction that can be applied to an individual power
plant ("any existing source"). To make things easy, let's just assume that EPA were to
look at a variety of different boiler types and vintages and were then to establish pre-
sumptive heat rates for boilers in each of these subcategories, based on the BSER that can
be applied to such boilers. It could then say that, because there are boiler-specific issues
that are difficult to take into account, it recommends that a state allow for trading around
this presumptive heat rate... In my view, this type of "trading" would clearly be al-
lowed." Email from Jeffrey Holmstead, partner and head of the Environmental Strategies
Group at law firm Bracewell & Giuliani, to author (Feb. 8, 2015) (on file with author).
148. KATE KONSCHNIK & ARI PESKOE, HARVARD LAW SCH. ENVTL. LAW PROGRAM,
EFFICIENCY RULES: THE CASE FOR END-USE ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS IN THE SEC-
TION 11I(D) RULE FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS 5 (Mar. 3, 2014),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/environmentallawprogram/files/2013/03/The-Role-of-
Energy-Efficiency-in-the- 111 d-Rule.pdf.
149. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 11 l(a)(1)(a), 42 U.S.C. 741 l(a)(1)(a) (2012) (indicat-
ing that standards may only "reflect" systems of emission reduction that the agency "de-
termines ha[ve] been adequately demonstrated").
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Despite their disagreement, Konschnik, Peskoe, and the industry
critics share a crucial insight. Specifically, they recognize that stringen-
cy and compliance are two different stages in the regulatory process with
(at least potentially) different legal standards.
This means that the issue of whether trading is legally permissible
under § 111 is really two separate questions. First, may the EPA consid-
er trading in setting regulatory requirements? Second, must each source
individually comply with those requirements? Or, may they trade with
each other such that they meet the requirements on average?
In short, the CAA performance standard process has two steps. Can
these steps have different rules? Even if one ultimately rejects these in-
dustry critics' conclusion that the answers to the two questions may be
(or are) different, the division of the issue is important. The reason is
simple: the text of § 111 may answer the first question, but it does al-
most nothing to answer the second.
1. Stringency and Compliance Are Different
To understand how this is the case, consider the § 11 l(a)(1) defini-
tion of "standard of performance" that includes the "best system" lan-
guage. Despite its presence in the "Definitions" section of § 111, it is not
really a definition at all, but rather a provision describing the regulator's
authority to determine the stringency of performance standards. Contra-
ry to what one might expect from a definition, § Il l(a)(1) says little, if
anything, about what performance standards look like in practice (in con-
trast to other regulatory tools). For example, nothing is said about what
form performance standards may take: must they be an emissions rate,
or can they be based on other performance measures? If they are emis-
sions rates, over what time period must those emissions be measured (an
issue that has led to significant past controversy and litigation)?15°
This is not to say that § 11 l(a)(1) necessarily should have specified
these details rather than leaving them implicitly to agency discretion, but
that such characteristics of performance standards-rather than substan-
tive factors for consideration in determining regulatory stringency-are
the kind of thing one might naively expect to find in a provision purport-
ing to define them. As most law students could tell you, it is not a sur-
prise to find a statutory scheme in which the definitions are "doing the
work." But the degree to which this is the case in § 111 is unusual.
Instead, the § 111 (a)(1 ' definition describes how the regulator must
identify the "best system," including the factors it must consider (cost,
whether a system has been "demonstrated," etc.).15' Once the agency
150. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007).
151. Clean Air Act § 111 (a)(1).
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identifies the "best system," § I11 (a)(1) indicates that it sets a standard at
a level that "reflects" that system.1 52 In other words, the "definition" tells
us how the regulator goes about determining the stringency of the stand-
ards.
The § 11 (a)(1) definition, including the "best system" language,
says nothing about how regulated sources may comply with the standard,
however. This is implicit in the nature of performance standards them-
selves: as noted above, the core characteristic of performance standards
is that they give regulated parties flexibility to determine how to meet
measurable standards set by the regulator-though note that this does not
mean that regulated parties have no restrictions on how to comply with
performance standards. Unlike traditional command-and-control regula-
tion, however, the process by which the regulator selects the stringency
of the regulation does not dictate the compliance options available. In
other words, once the "best system" has been identified and used as a ba-
sis for determining the stringency of performance standards, it ceases to
be relevant for compliance purposes. In simplest terms, BSER is about
stringency, not compliance.
This is the insight at the heart of some critics' argument that the
EPA may (and, they say, should) allow trading and other forms of com-
pliance flexibility even if the agency must take a narrow, source-focused
view when setting the standards. The critics have a narrow reading of
"best system" that may or may not be correct insofar as it purports to re-
strict the EPA's range of options in setting stringency, but they are cor-
rect in their understanding that stringency and compliance options are
separate issues in the § 111 context (and indeed in the context of any per-
formance standard).
2. Are Stringency and Compliance Connected?
An alternative argument is that § 111 should be interpreted such
that the range of options available to the regulator in determining the
"best system" and the range of options available to sources in complying
with the resulting standard are one and the same. If this reading were
correct, then even though the § I II(a)(1) definition and the "best sys-
tem" language only directly control the range of options available to the
regulator in setting stringency, they implicitly also control compliance
options as well. However, this argument cannot be correct-at most this
connection operates in only one direction.
The reason is simple-it cannot be true that sources complying with
a performance standard are restricted to the compliance options consid-




acter of performance standards themselves, and is crucial to their ability
to create incentives for innovation. For example, under the § 1 1 (a)(1)
definition of performance standards, regulators may not consider emis-
sions-reducing technologies or other compliance options that are not
"demonstrated." But a firm complying with the resulting standard could
develop new technology to do so, or use a technology or work practice
that, while previously available, had not been adequately demonstrated
when the standard was written. Moreover, one of the best justifications
for performance standards over command-and-control regulation is that
regulators have imperfect information about compliance options. If
sources may only comply using options considered by the regulator, this
advantage is absent.
The reverse, however, is likely not the case. In setting the standard
at the level of the "best system of emissions reduction," regulators may
not consider compliance options that are not, in reality, available to emit-
ters that must comply with the standard. The "adequately demonstrated"
prong of § 11 1 (a) addresses this from a practical standpoint-it prevents
the regulator from requiring a level of performance that cannot actually
be met in practice.
As noted above, Kate Konschnik and Ari Peskoe of Harvard take
this concept further, arguing that regulators must consider compliance
options that regulators know are available to emitters when they set the
standard's stringency.1 53 According to their symmetry principle, "any
adequately demonstrated system of emission reduction eligible for com-
pliance with a performance standard must also drive the standard's strin-
gency."' 5 4 In short, the symmetry principle is an expansion of the central
principle of performance standard stringency setting: agencies may not
consider unavailable options, and also must consider available options.
This puts Konschnik and Peskoe squarely at odds with the view held by
some industry critics of the CPP and summarized at the beginning of this
Section: that regulators should allow trading as a compliance tool for
standards whose stringency is based only on compliance options availa-
ble at individual facilities.
However, even with the addition of the symmetry principle, the
§ 1 1 (a)(1) definition doesn't say what compliance options are actually
available. This is fairly obvious: The agency still must do extensive
analysis to determine what technological or work practice compliance
options are available and adequately demonstrated. In other words, de-
spite its name, the symmetry principle does not operate in reverse in this
sense. Just because a regulator decides a compliance option is part of the
best system does not make it available-technically or legally.
153. KONSCHNIK & PESKOE, supra note 148, at 5.
154. Id.
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The process of assessing technological, economic, and practical
availability of compliance options is well established and understood (al-
beit complex and burdensome for the agency). But there are legal as
well as technical limits. Section 111 itself restricts at least some compli-
ance options, such as emissions offsets, as discussed in Section IV.B
above.1 55 Other parts of the CAA (or other environmental statutes and
regulations) also impose legal barriers to some compliance options.
56
Even more simply, background legal principles limit emitters' compli-
ance options.
It would be inequitable and arguably illegal for regulators to base a
performance standard on compliance options that would require emitters
to violate any of these legal requirements. For example, regulators pre-
sumably could not base a performance standard on a "best system" that
"[r]equires release of pollutants into water instead of air, in violation of
Clean Water Act requirements[,] . . . [w]ould cause such large increases
in emissions of other pollutants that emitters would be able to meet other
CAA requirements[,] ... [or] [i]nvolves use of dangerous technology that
is illegal in some jurisdictions.'57
Legal as well as practical limits on the compliance options available
to emitters therefore must be considered when regulators set performance
standards' stringency. The symmetry principle is an important corollary
to this-if an option is available, Konschnik and Peskoe argue, the regu-
lator must consider it. But the range of options regulators may consider
under one's interpretation of the "best system" language does not simi-
larly restrict (or broaden) sources' compliance options. The relationship
between the two ranges is one-way-the range of compliance options
that are actually available must be reflected in stringency setting, but the
broad range of options implied by the "best system" language does not
mean a similarly broad range of compliance options is actually available,
both technically and legally.
If this reading is correct, then debates over the legality of trading as
a compliance option under § 11 have focused on a part of the statutory
text--"best system of emissions reduction"-that does not and cannot
answer the legal issue, no matter how broadly or narrowly it is interpret-
155. See Richardson, supra note 133.
156. For example, emitters of hazardous pollutants regulated under § 112 of the
CAA must comply individually with emissions standards reflecting "maximum available
control technology" or MACT, and must do so individually, without trading. See general-
ly Clean Air Act § 112. This makes sense in the hazardous pollution context since trading
might allow "hot spots" to occur with emissions levels sufficient to endanger public
health, even if a trading system led to reduced average emissions within the sector. The
lack of trading under § 112 is what led EPA to attempt to move mercury regulation from
that section of the statute to § 111. The DC Circuit rejected this move in New Jersey v.
EPA, cited in supra note 142.
157. Clean Air Act § 111 (a)(1).
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ed. Although I raised this possibility in passing in earlier work,158 it has
to my knowledge otherwise been missing from these debates.
3. The EPA's View of the "Best System"
The EPA appears to recognize this in the proposed ESPS rulemak-
ing. The agency does point to the § 1 1 (a)(1) definition of "standard of
performance" in its defense of trading, but does not use "best system of
emissions reduction" or any of the specific language in the § I1 l(a)(1)
definition in that defense.t59 Instead, the agency simply argues that the
§ I1 1 (a)(1) definition is "broad enough" to allow flexibility before point-
ing to alternative sources--essentially, the dictionary definition of
"standard"-that it argues shine greater light on the question.160  The
EPA's arguments are discussed in greater detail in Section VI.I below.
If (as most have argued), the reason flexibility is available under
§ I 11 (d) is that it is part of the "best system," or if the reason that such
flexibility is not available is that "best system" should be interpreted nar-
rowly, then it would be a major surprise if the agency failed to discuss
(or attempt to refute) that line of reasoning. As the EPA therefore im-
plicitly recognizes, guidance on what compliance options are available
under § 111 performance standards must come from elsewhere in the
statute, not the § 11 1 (a)(1) definition and its "best system" language.
F. Does § 111 Give Any Guidance on Compliance Options?
If the § 11 l(a)(1) definition gives no guidance on what compliance
options are available to sources regulated with performance standards,
one might hope to find such guidance elsewhere in § I 11. No such luck,
unfortunately-§ 11 1 is quite short161 and gives little detail on how per-
formance standard regulation is to operate in practice. Much of the sec-
tion covers procedural requirements and technical details 62 rather than
substantive guidance (there is even a provision whose applicability is
limited to grain elevators).163 Only one provision explicitly discusses
compliance options, and it gives no detail on what options are or are not
available-its only effect is to prevent regulators from requiring that cer-
tain technology be used to comply (in other words, it requires that § I 11
158. See Richardson, supra note 133.
159. CPP, supra note 3, at 34,927.
160. Id.
161. Clean Air Act § 111 is around 3000 words, and § 111(d) is only about 300
words. In contrast, the three sections (§ 108-10) that define the NAAQS process total
over 7500 words.
162. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §§ 11 (f), (g), (a)(8).
163. Seeid. at§ 111(i).
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regulations be technology-agnostic performance standards rather than
command-and-control rules). 16'
This lack of detail on compliance options is perhaps unsurprising to
the extent that the primary purpose of § 111 is to establish a regulatory
program for new sources. As discussed above, practical limitations and
legal restrictions outside of § 111 limit new sources' compliance options
to technology, operational practices, and fuel choice-each of which re-
sult in emissions reductions at the regulated source. Since trading isn't a
realistic option for new sources, there is little need for it to be discussed
in the bulk of § 1 11. Arguably, the drafters of § 111 never considered
trading among sources or other forms of compliance flexibility for new
sources, and with good reason.
But § 111 (d) creates an almost entirely separate regulatory program
in the existing-source context where compliance flexibility (as discussed
above) does matter a great deal. Accordingly, one might hope that the
drafters of § 111 (d) provided some guidance in the subsection regarding
compliance options. But if § Ill is short relative to the scope of the reg-
ulatory program it creates, that mismatch is far greater in the specific
case of § 1 11 (d). Section 111 (d) is only about 300 words long, and most
of that length is devoted to procedural issues and the division of authority
between states and the federal government.165  Section 1 1 (d) is little
help.
The result is that § 1 11 gives almost no guidance on what compli-
ance options are available to regulated sources.166 This is unusual within
the context of the CAA. Other parts of the statute establishing other reg-
ulatory programs generally do give guidance on what compliance options
are available, and that guidance can be quite extensive.
G. Trading Elsewhere in the CAA
One might, therefore, hope to find support for trading under ESPS
(or a clear indication that it is not available) by looking at § 111 in the
context of the broader statute. But other sections of the CAA do not ap-
pear to be very helpful.
164. See id. at § 11 l(b)(5) (stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized under sub-
section (h) of this section, nothing in this section shall be construed to require, or to au-
thorize the Administrator to require, any new or modified source to install and operate
any particular technological system of continuous emission reduction to comply with any
new source standard of performance").
165. See id. at § 111 (d); for example, subsection (d)(2) details EPA's authority to is-
sue a federal plan when states fail to act.
166. As noted above, the only guidance is § 11 l(b)(5)'s statement hat standards are
performance targets, not technological requirements.
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1. § 1 10 and § 111 (d)'s Cross-Reference to It
The first and most obvious place to look is § 1 10, which governs
implementation of the NAAQS. Section 110 explicitly authorizes states
to use trading in their state implementation plans aimed at meeting the
federally-set NAAQS: plans may include "fees, marketable permits, and
auctions of emissions rights" among other tools.16 7 Of course it cannot
be assumed that authorization of trading under § 110, by itself, makes
trading available under § I 11. In fact, the opposite inference could be
made, as discussed further below-§ 1 10(a)(2)(A) indicates that Con-
gress knows what trading is and how to authorize it, but failed to do so
(or give any other guidance on compliance tools) in § 111.
However, § 11 1 (d) explicitly references § I 10 by directing EPA to
"establish a procedure similar to that provided by section 110" under
which states submit plans to the agency for approval. Some have argued
that direct reference does import the list of tools in § 1 10(a)(2)(A) into
§ 1 1 (d), or at least imply congressional approval for doing S.68 How-
ever, § 11 l(d)'s cross-reference to § 1 10 is explicitly procedural-EPA
is directed to set up a process similar to § 110, not to import the substan-
tive requirements of the NAAQS regime, whether they apply to initial
standard-setting or compliance tools available to emitters. To import
both procedure and substance would be to simply re-create the NAAQS
or at least a similar regime under § I 11.
It is true that § 111(d) refers to § 1 10 as a whole, including both its
procedural and substantive elements. It could have referred only to the
state plan/EPA approval process within § 1 10, perhaps by referencing
§ 1 10(a)(1) only. But the fact that it is not so limited does not necessari-
ly mean that the cross-reference is unbounded. This is because the limi-
tation of the cross-reference to process alone comes not from the scope
of the citation, but rather from the text of § 11 1 (d) surrounding the refer-
ence: § 111 (d) directs the EPA to "establish a procedure similar to"
§ 11 0-to mimic it more broadly.
This reading is supported by reading § 1 1 (d) within the broader
§ 11 1 context. As discussed above, whether they are EPA setting NSPS
under § 11 1(b) or states submitting plans under § 11 (d), regulators are
required to use performance standards, as defined in § 111 (a). 69 In other
words, regulators operating under § 1 11 are restricted to a single regula-
tory tool-performance standards. This is in contrast to § 1 10, where
states are given a substantive target-the NAAQS-along with explicit
flexibility to choose among a wide variety of regulatory tools to meet
167. Clean Air Act § 1 10(a)(2)(A).
168. WANNIER ET AL., supra note 129 at 4.
169. Clean Air Act §§ 11 l(b)(1)(B), 11 l(d)(1)(A) (stating that states must submit a
plan that "establishes standards of performance").
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that target. The primary differences between § 111(b) NSPS and
§ 111 (d) ESPS are that they cover different sources (new vs. existing)
and that ESPS include an important state role-not that they use different
regulatory tools. The reference to § 110 does not change this. Instead, it
allows a well-developed cooperative federalism process to be imported
into § 111 (d). Without it, drafters would have had to create a new pro-
cess from scratch, which is something that would have arguably been a
waste of effort under any conditions and maybe impossible when
§ 111 (d) was drafted as a late compromise in negotiations over the 1970
Act. 170 There is nothing wrong with such expediency, but it should not
be taken to mean more than what it explicitly claims to be-a procedural
model for § 111 (d).
Section 111(d) also contains a second reference to § 110:
§ 1 l(d)(2)(A) refers to § 110(c) in giving EPA authority to impose a
federal plan when states fail to submit a satisfactory plan, as discussed
above. This reference also appears purely procedural, and in any case
§ 1 10(c) says nothing about trading.
2. Trading Elsewhere in the CAA
Looking beyond § 1 10, other sections of the CAA and related stat-
utes also explicitly or implicitly allow emissions trading or similar mech-
anisms. This section details two such examples.
Perhaps most notably, Title IV of the Act, added in the 1990 CAA
amendments, creates an expansive regulatory program covering sulfur
dioxide. Emissions trading is at the heart of this program and is dis-
cussed at length, beginning with Congress' declared "Purposes" in
§ 401(b), stating that "limitations may be met through alternative meth-
ods of compliance provided by an emission allocation and transfer sys-
tem".171 The statute also details emissions allowance allocation172 and
the EPA's regulatory authority to create a trading market.173 Congress'
intent not only to allow but also to require emissions trading under Title
IV could not be clearer.
Title II of the Act, governing vehicle emissions, does not explicitly
allow trading, but instead directs the EPA to issue "standards" while (in
this respect like § 1 11) remaining silent on whether these may include
trading. 174 However, the primary means of regulating vehicle emissions,
the CAFE standards, are issued jointly and under separate legal authority
170. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 42, at 11096-97.
171. Clean Air Act § 401(b).
172. Id. at § 403(a).
173. Id. at § 403(b).
174. See id. at §§ 202(a)(1), 213. The term "standards" is not defined in Title II,
though the definition of "emission standard" in section 302(k) may apply. This definition
does not explicitly discuss trading.
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by the EPA and the Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT authori-
ty under 49 U.S.C. § 329 does explicitly allow trading.7 5 Averaging
across vehicle types in a manufacturer's fleet has been allowed since the
1970s, and the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act allowed
trading between manufacturers.176 Subsequent EPA/DOT CAFE stand-
ards finalized in 2010 and 2012 aimed at reducing carbon emissions from
vehicles have allowed inter-manufacturer credit trading. 1
77
Taken together, these statutory provisions show Congress is aware
of trading as a regulatory tool in the air pollution context and is certainly
able to write and pass statutory text explicitly making it available. Con-
gress' failure to do so (or to forbid trading) in § 111 generally or
§ 111 (d) specifically-and indeed its failure to give almost any guidance
about compliance options for § Ill performance standards-makes the
availability of trading under ESPS an open (and to date untested) legal
question. The next section discusses how reviewing courts might resolve
that question.
H. Historical Arguments
Arguments both for and against trading under § 111 (d) can be made
based on the evolution of the statutory language over time. While prob-
ably not dispositive, and not (or at least not widely) discussed in debates
over ESPS trading, they are at least worth mentioning.
As discussed above, the original version of § 111 (d) directed states
to impose "emission standards" rather than "standards of performance."
The former term is not defined in the statute and might be susceptible to
a broader reading. If so, Congress' 1977 restriction of state § 111 (d)
powers regarding "performance standards" could be interpreted as indi-
cating an intent to narrow that authority, possibly to foreclose trading.
Other changes in § I11 's text point in the other direction. In the
1977 CAA amendments, Congress modified the definition of perfor-
mance standards in § 1 1(a) to state that they were to reflect the "best
technological system of continuous emission reduction" for new sources
and "best system of continuous emission reduction" for existing sources,
in contrast to the previous, simpler "best system of emission reduction."
Then, in the 1990 amendments, Congress returned to the earlier phrase
for both new and existing sources.78 This could be interpreted as evi-
175. See 49 U.S.C. § 32903 (2012).
176. See Energy Independence & Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 104,
121 Stat. 1491, 1502 (2007).
177. See EPA, Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy Standards, supra note 60, at 25,338; EPA, 2017 and Later
Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards, supra note 60, at 62,628.
178. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 42, at 11096-97.
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dence of congressional intent to broaden the definition of "systems" reg-
ulators can consider in setting performance standards.
However, as discussed above, even a very broad understanding of
"best system" is unhelpful in determining what compliance options are
available since that phrase applies only to regulators' stringency deter-
mination.
I. The EPA's Argument for Trading
Before discussing how a court might resolve this question, however,
it is important to first examine the EPA's view. It reflects a close read-
ing of the statute and is likely to receive significant deference from a re-
viewing court under the Chevron doctrine.
Given the absence of guidance in § 111 on compliance options and
(as noted above) the agency's refusal to adopt the mainstream view that
the "best system" language is sufficient to allow ESPS trading, where
does the agency find authority to allow it? As noted above, the EPA ba-
ses its argument that trading is available on the term "performance stand-
ard" itself:
CAA section 111 (d) plans may include standards of perfor-
mance that authorize emissions averaging and trading. ... The
EPA proposes that the definition of "standard of perfor-
mance" is broad enough to incorporate emissions averaging
and trading provisions. ... The term "standard" in the phrase
"standard for emissions of air pollutants" is not defined in the
CAA. As the Supreme Court noted in a CAA case,179 a "stand-
ard" is simply "that which 'is established by authority, cus-
tom, or general consent, as a model or example; criterion; test.'
"A tradable emission rate or a tradable mass limit is a "stand-
ard for emissions of air pollutants" because it establishes an
emissions limit for a source's air pollutants, and as a result,
qualifies as a "criterion" or "test" for those air pollutants.180
In other words, the EPA argues, any regulation that plausibly fits within
the dictionary definition of "standard" is permitted under § 111, as long
as it meets the statute's more specific requirements, which, as we have
seen, deal only with determining stringency, not compliance options.
Since allowing trading doesn't fundamentally change the nature of the
regulatory approach, § 111 regulators may allow it.
179. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252-53
(2004) (quoting Webster's Second International Dictionary, at 2455 (1945)).
180. CPP, supra note 3, at 34,927 [some footnotes omitted].
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Alternatively, the EPA points to the CAA's general definitions sec-
tion, § 302, which defines "performance standard" as "a requirement of
continuous emission reduction"' 18 and states that
... although there may be doubt that the definition of "stand-
ard of performance" in CAA section 302(1) applies to CAA
section 111 (d) in light of the fact that the definition of the same
term in CAA section 111 (a)(1) is more specific, even if the
CAA section 302(1) definition does apply, an averaging or trad-
ing requirement qualifies as a "continuous emission reduc-
tion" because, in the case of a tradable emission rate, the rate
is applicable at all times, and, in the case of a tradable mass
limit, the source is always under the obligation that its emis-
sions be covered by allowances.
182
These arguments place great weight on a few terms and are not al-
together satisfying. There is almost no regulatory scheme or compliance
option that would not fall within the broad dictionary definition of
"standard." If the general § 302(1) definition is applicable, it does add
the requirement of "continuous emission reduction," but that also does
little to limit the range of compliance options available. It is somewhat
puzzling that the EPA cites the § 302(1) definition in support of its case
for the availability of trading since, if anything, it appears to offer more
support for the position that trading is not permissible. Sources that are
permitted to trade may not do any "emissions reduction" at all if they
buy credits instead of making local improvements, and even those that do
may not do so on a "continuous" basis.
The EPA also argues that there is precedential support for trading
under § 111 (d) ESPS by pointing to two previous ESPS programs that
included trading.83 However, this support is very weak. One of the two
cited programs, the 2005 Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR),184 was never
implemented because it was rejected by courts on unrelated grounds.'85
The legality of trading under § 111 was controversial at the time and had
been briefed, but the court never reached the issue. It is hard to under-
stand how CAMR, therefore, gives any precedential support. The other
cited program, aimed at municipal waste combustors, 86 is in place, but is
181. Id. at 34, 927; Clean Air Act § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 7602 (2012).
182. CPP, supra note 3, at 34,927.
183. Id.
184. See EPA, "Clean Air Mercury Rule", supra note 140.
185. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that
EPA's preliminary move de-listing mercury from the list of hazardous air pollutants in
Section § 112 of the CAA, a necessary prerequisite for regulating under § 111, exceeded
the agency's authority).
186. See EPA, Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emission
Guidelines for Existing Sources: supra note 91, at 27,324.
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co-authorized by a different CAA provision that complicates any legal
analysis. 187
It is also possible to make arguments grounded in the statute against
the availability of trading under § I 11 (d) regulation-Jeff Holmstead1
8 8
and Lisa Heinzerling's189 positions, summarized briefly above, are both
at least partly textual, though both bring in other sources of authority.
Nevertheless, these and any similar argument suffer the same weakness
as pro-trading arguments grounded in the text of § 1 11-that text just
doesn't offer guidance on what compliance options are available to regu-
lated sources. This is why neither Holmstead nor Heinzerling can rely
on the text of § 111 alone and are forced to bring in other sources of au-
thority (extra-statutory evidence of congressional intent in Heinzerling's
case, and longstanding EPA practice in Holmstead's).
VII. TRADING UNMOORED
As discussed above, in the absence of guidance under either the
§ 11 l(a)(1) definition or § 11 (d), it becomes difficult to identify a statu-
tory basis for trading under the ESPS. One is forced either to read the
tealeaves in the CAA text as best as possible, or simply to conclude that
the statute is silent and proceed accordingly.
A. Who Would Sue?
As a result of this ambiguity (and the level of controversy and atten-
tion surrounding the CPP), the issue of trading under the carbon ESPS is
almost certain to be litigated. This is despite the fact that most partici-
pants in the ESPS process-the EPA, environmental groups, states, and
industry groups-broadly favor trading as a compliance option (though,
as discussed above, there is sharp disagreement over whether trading can
be considered in setting the standard). All it takes is one plaintiff with
standing to raise a legal issue, however, and it is not difficult to imagine
a plaintiff claiming in litigation that trading is incompatible with
§ 11 (d) ESPS. For example, some environmental groups are ideologi-
cally opposed to emissions trading. 90 Industry and/or state litigants
187. The municipal waste combustor program is jointly authorized under CAA §
111 and CAA § 129, the latter of which details extensive additional and specific require-
ments for the program. § 129 indicates that existing sources are to be subject to § 111 (d)
performance standards, but also indicates that these performance standards are to include
"emissions limitations," which is not defined.
188. See Testimony of Jeffrey R. Holmstead, supra note 144.
189. See Heinzerling & Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury & the Bush Administra-
tion, supra note 145.
190. See, e.g., Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. CARB, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (2012)
(illustrating instance of environmental justice groups unsuccessfully challenging Califor-
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might also be willing to make any claim that would slow or threaten the
ESPS regulation. 191 A clever industry litigant might also base a suit (and
arguments for standing) on Konschinik and Peskoe's symmetry princi-
ple, discussed above. Under this theory, a hypothetical plaintiff would
argue that the ESPS' stringency is much greater than it would be had the
EPA not assumed that states would allow regulated sources to trade with
each other. In short, it is unlikely that a trading scheme under § 111 (d)
would survive simply because no plaintiff would want to challenge it or
have standing to do so.
A related issue not addressed here is whether litigation over trading
would properly come as a challenge to the EPA's final § 11 (d) rulemak-
ing or to a state plan submitted under that rulemaking. It is possible that
a challenging party would only have standing once a state plan actually
imposes compliance obligations along with the ability to trade. The dis-
tinction is likely unimportant for resolution of the legal question, howev-
er, because § 111 (d) requires states to use performance standards in their
plans.192 The definition of performance standards in the CAA therefore
controls-while states' police powers certainly allow them to impose an
emissions trading system, the CAA controls whether such a system may
be included within a § 11 l(d) plan or, more accurately, whether the EPA
can approve such a plan.
B. Possible Outcomes
In any case, once the issue has been raised in litigation and standing
has been established, the reviewing court (initially the D.C. Circuit, and
possibly the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal) would be required to deter-
mine whether trading is legally compatible with § 111. This section dis-
cusses potential bases on which a court might resolve this question. To
cut to the chase, the outcome is fraught with uncertainty.
nia's cap-and-trade program on the grounds that it would result in concentration of emis-
sions in vulnerable communities).
191. Many industry litigants might lack standing to challenge the availability of trad-
ing since such a claim would fail the injury-in-fact prong of standing doctrine-if trading
lowers compliance costs, then many emitters would benefit from it. However, some
sources could establish injury. For example, a relatively clean source might claim that it
is better off if sources must individually comply since it would be able to do so but that
relatively dirty competitors could not (though one might ask why such a source would not
prefer to sell credits to its dirty competitors). Additionally, a state challenger might argue
that it is disadvantaged by trading if it has a small, homogenous set of emitting sources,
and other states with which it is competing for investment have a more diverse mix of
sources that would disproportionately benefit from trading.
192. Clean Air Act § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(d) (2012).
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1. Deference to the EPA-Chevron
Despite the apparent weakness of some of the agency's arguments,
it may prevail due to the deference shown by courts to agency interpreta-
tions of their own governing statutes. Therefore, perhaps the best argu-
ment that trading is permissible under § 11 l(d) ESPS is simply that the
statute apparently does not forbid it. Since the dictionary definition of
"standard" to which the EPA refers in its proposal is so broad, the agen-
cy's "textual" argument for trading arguably distills to the same thing-
the statute is silent. The EPA's view is that this silence gives § 11 1 regu-
lators license to allow trading.
In more precise legal terms, the simplest and arguably most likely
outcome of litigation is preservation of trading under § 11 1 (d) based on
Chevron deference to the EPA. Under Chevron, agency interpretations
of law are entitled to deference, so long as they do not contradict the
plain meaning of the statutory text (Chevron step one) and are within a
"reasonable" interpretive range (Chevron step tWO). 193
Analysis of the trading issue under this doctrine might proceed as
follows. First, § I 11 is clearly ambiguous with regard to whether trading
is permissible as a compliance option because (as discussed at length
above) the statute is silent on this subject. Statutory arguments in favor
of trading, such as the EPA's reliance on the dictionary definition of
"standard," or those against trading, such as those based on the source-
focused or technology-focused character of § 11 1 performance standards,
are at best illuminating, but do not resolve this ambiguity. In other
words, neither side initially appears likely to prevail based on Chevron
step one plain meaning arguments.
Under Chevron step two, the agency interpretation receives signifi-
cant deference-agencies only rarely lose at this stage.194  The just-
mentioned arguments against trading appear insufficient o establish that
the EPA's interpretation is unreasonable. Therefore, the agency appears
likely to prevail at Chevron step two, with the result that trading remains
permissible under the statute.
2. Plain Meaning
This analysis may, however, be too simplistic. Despite the statute's
silence on the question of compliance options, a reviewing court might
193. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
194. See David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental
Law, 34 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 4 (2010) (quoting D.C. Circuit judge stating that "[b]ut
even where Congress has left an agency statutory space to choose its own interpretation,
that interpretation must still be reasonable. Although agencies rarely lose at this 'Chevron
step two' stage, it remains a limitation that courts carefully enforce").
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not so readily find that § 111 (d) is ambiguous in the relevant respect. In
fact, a court might find that silence itself to be evidence that Congress
intended trading not be allowed. In other words, silence might be con-
sidered either evidence of ambiguity or evidence against it.
That argument might go something like this. First, trading is not
discussed in the bulk of § 111 because, for the reasons discussed above,
it is not practical or plausible in the new source context. Even the
strongest advocates for trading under § 111 (d) ESPS do not argue that it
should be available for new sources, so silence on the question in most of
§ 1 11 is not informative.
Moreover, § 11 l(d)'s further and specific silence regarding trading
in the existing source context is not sufficient to create statutory ambi-
guity on the question. Congress understands how to clearly indicate that
trading and other flexible tools are available to state regulators in other
CAA contexts, including in § 110 (which, as described above, is explicit-
ly cited in § 111 (d) as a procedural model).
The reviewing court could then recite trading critics' arguments re-
garding the technology-focused and source-focused character of perfor-
mance standards. These arguments, even if not dispositive on their own,
are instructive. It could be argued that they place the burden on the
statutory text of § 111 (d) to show some evidence that trading might be
permissible-something, as discussed at length above, that it probably
cannot do. The result, the court could at least plausibly conclude, is that
the statutory text is not ambiguous at all. Under this reading, traditional
tools of statutory interpretation are sufficient to foreclose trading under
ESPS.
To put it most simply, the first sentence of an opinion finding
against trading would recite the legal fact that the EPA, or any agency,
only has those powers granted to it by Congress. The remainder of the
opinion would search for such authority in § 111 and ultimately fail to
find it.
Despite the deference ostensibly shown to agencies under Chevron,
there is significant recent evidence of courts showing skepticism toward
EPA interpretations of the CAA that share important similarities with
trading under § 11 1 ESPS. On two relatively recent occasions, the D.C.
Circuit has rejected EPA rulemakings including trading in programs
aimed at reducing interstate air pollution under § 110 and § 129 of the
statute.195 Although the latter of these two decisions was later reversed
by the U.S. Supreme Court,196 the resulting regulation has been stripped
195. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(vacating EPA's Clean Air Interstate Rule); EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696
F.3d 7, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting EPA's replacement, the Cross-State Air Pollution
Rule).
196. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. at 1610.
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of its most significant trading provisions.'97 In the rulemakings at issue
in these cases, the EPA allowed interstate trading despite there being lit-
tle or no statutory text to support it.
Among other reasons, the D.C. Circuit rejected this trading as in-
consistent with the statute since it would allow states to buy emissions
allowances rather than abate their emissions as (the court ruled) required
by the statute. This view closely parallels that of some critics of § 1 11
trading-as noted above, if trading is allowed, some sources will not
meet the emissions rate target in the performance standard, instead buy-
ing allowances from other sources that over comply. Critics of trading
claim that this is inconsistent with § 111 because, they argue, such
sources would no longer comply with the performance standards.'9 8
The D.C. Circuit's rulings were driven by traditional tools of statu-
tory interpretation, leading the court to conclude that the EPA's interpre-
tation was inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.99 These
arguments are probably stronger in the textual context of the interstate
trading cases than for trading under § 1 11 (d), in large part because the
text at issue in those sections provides a specific substantive goal for the
regulatory program (elimination of "significant contribution" from up-
wind states to downwind states' nonattainment of national air quality
standards).200 No such goal is explicitly stated in § 111. Nevertheless,
the interstate trading cases do illustrate that courts may be willing to re-
ject trading in CAA programs, using Chevron step one-style arguments,
when the statute is silent.
Even if § 111 (d) is determined by a reviewing court to be ambigu-
ous in the relevant sense, the same or similar arguments could be de-
ployed to establish that the EPA's interpretation is outside the "reasona-
ble" or "permissible" range. Some scholars have recognized this
rhetorical and possibly doctrinal similarity between Chevron's ostensibly
separate steps, and argued that in reality Chevron has only one step.
201
197. See Nathan Richardson, Death of Cap-and-Trade?, THE PROGRESSIVE FIX (July
8, 2010), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/issues/death-of-cap-and-trade/.
198. See, e.g., Testimony of Lisa Heinzerling, supra note 146 (arguing that § 111 re-
quires each individual facility to comply with performance standards).
199. See North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 907 (holding that EPA's proposed cap-and-
trade program fails to comply with the statutory mandate to prohibit pollution from one
state from interfering with air quality in downwind states).
200. Id.
201. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only
One Step, 95 VA. L. REv. 597 (2009) (arguing that Step One and Step Two analyses are




3. A High-Stakes Exception to Chevron?
Even if Chevron doctrine does give additional deference to agencies
when the statutory text is ambiguous, that deference does not necessarily
mean agencies will prevail. Though agencies lose at Chevron step two
only rarely, the two most well-known such defeats were in CAA cases at
the U.S. Supreme Court, in opinions authored by Justice Scalia.2 °2 In
both of these cases, Justice Scalia supported his textual arguments with a
general principle that courts are, or at least should be, skeptical of agency
claims to find support for ambitious regulatory programs in sparse statu-
tory text.2°3 Congress, Scalia stated, "does not hide elephants in mouse
holes,' '2°4 and the U.S. Supreme Court "expect[s] Congress to speak
clearly if it wishes to assign an agency decisions of vast 'economic and
political significance.'
20 5
It is possible that hese statements are no more than dicta added for
rhetorical effect. Alternatively, however, they can be understood as an
exception to Chevron deference. The zone of "reasonableness" may nar-
row when regulations with large practical or economic impact are based
on thin statutory support. If this "Whitman exception" to Chevron is in-
deed an element of Supreme Court doctrine, it is hard to imagine a more
likely case for it to be applied than in litigation over § 111 (d) ESPS. As
discussed above, the ESPS will have extremely large economic and envi-
ronmental effects, and are based on a tiny, rarely used statutory provi-
sion. The issue of trading is central to their form, extent, cost, and envi-
ronmental impact. Courts might therefore show the agency less
deference-perhaps ubstantially less-than Chevron would appear to
indicate. In fact, some observers argue that Scalia added the language
regarding ambitious agency interpretations of narrow statutory text to the
recent UARG decision specifically as a warning to the EPA (which had at
the time of the decision only just recently proposed its carbon ESPS).2 °6
More broadly, an agency loss on Chevron step two, a "Whitman ex-
ception," or even a rejection of agency authority on nondelegation
grounds (as discussed below) can each be viewed as judicial responses to
202. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Util Air Regulatory
Grp. (UARG) v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
203. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468; UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2445.
204. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468.
205. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2445 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
206. See Marita Noon, You Cannot Rewrite Laws to Achieve Your Political Agenda,
REDSTATE.COM (July 14, 2014, 10:11 AM),
http://www.redstate.com/diary/energyrabbit/2014/07/14/marita-noon-rewrite-laws-
achieve-political-agenda/ (quoting Tom Wood, partner at Stoel Rives LLP, stating that
"the Supreme Court decision seems to give more ammunition to those who want to chal-
lenge an expansive view of 11 l(d)").
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the same perceived underlying problem. When an administrative agency
takes action with large economic effects based on ambiguous statutory
text, it invites additional judicial scrutiny, and if that scrutiny leads to a
rejection of the agency's position, it can be dressed in a variety of doctri-
nal clothes.
4. Does Chevron Even Apply?
It is further possible that the EPA's interpretation of the § 1 11 text
to allow trading is not even entitled to Chevron deference at all. Under
§ 11 (d) ESPS, states-not he EPA-are the primary regulators. States
will therefore determine (at least initially) whether trading is allowed un-
der their ESPS programs, what form it will take, and who may partici-
pate. Even if trading is consistent with § I 11, the EPA almost certainly
cannot require a state to use it. The EPA takes this position in its rule-
making-in its defense of § 111 trading in the ESPS proposal, it argues
that "CAA section 111 (d) plans may include standards of performance
that authorize emissions averaging and trading.-207 The agency is there-
fore offering an interpretation of the CAA that governs states' authority,
not its own.
Such an advisory interpretation is arguably not entitled to Chevron
deference. In United States vs. Mead Corp.,208 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that Chevron deference is applicable only when Congress delegated
interpretive authority to the agency, and when those interpretations carry
the force of law.20 9 The EPA's interpretation of the CAA to permit trad-
ing under ESPS arguably does not meet this standard since it does not
actually implement a trading program or limit states' discretion to do so.
Only if a state failed to submit a satisfactory plan and the EPA was
forced to issue a federal plan including a trading provision would its in-
terpretation of the statute with regard to trading "carry the force of
law.
, 210
Under Mead, the earlier, less-deferential Skidmore211 standard is ap-
plied to agency interpretations that are not entitled to Chevron deference.
This could increase the likelihood of the EPA's interpretation being over-
turned. However, Justice Scalia dissented in Mead, arguing that Skid-
more deference has no place after Chevron.212 Since he would likely be
among the justices favoring a narrow interpretation of regulatory authori-
ty under § 111, he could be faced with an awkward choice between ac-
207. CPP, supra note 3, at 34, 927 (emphasis added).
208. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
209. Id. at 221.
210. Id.
211. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 (1944).
212. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239.
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cepting Mead and showing less deference to the EPA, or maintaining his
position that Chevron should control. A separate opinion (either concur-
ring or dissenting, depending on the majority's position) could be the re-
suit, with Justice Scalia either accepting Mead under stare decisis but
noting his continued objection, or analyzing the interpretive question un-
der Chevron deference and perhaps still finding against the agency.
If this view of U.S. Supreme Court doctrine is correct, then the
question of what degree of deference is shown to state interpretations of
federal statutes becomes relevant. Since states will actually make the de-
cisions regarding trading under § 111 that "carry the force of law," their
interpretation of the statute might be entitled to greater deference than
the EPA's advisory interpretation. But the level of deference shown to
state interpretations is not clearly settled. At least some lower courts
have applied Skidmore deference, or something like it,213 but the U.S.
Supreme Court has not indicated which level of deference (if any) should
apply. The D.C. Circuit might apply Skidmore, Chevron, or a different
standard.
Mead and ambiguity about deference shown to state interpretations
has strategic significance for the EPA. If the agency believes that access
to Chevron deference is important to the survival of its interpretation of
the CAA allowing trading, then it might be better served not to mention
that interpretation at all in its final rulemaking where it would be subject
to legal challenge but could receive only Skidmore deference. A decision
based on Skidmore rejecting trading under ESPS would appear to create
controlling precedent even if the agency would have prevailed under
Chevron deference. Instead, the agency could leave it to states to take
formal positions on trading, since they might be entitled to greater defer-
ence. Alternatively, the EPA could take an interpretive position on trad-
ing, in the context of a federal plan for a state that refused to submit its
own plan, in which context the agency would appear to be entitled to
Chevron deference. These contradictory outcomes for similar or identi-
cal interpretations presented in different procedural contexts appear to
illustrate the wisdom of Justice Scalia's critique of Mead.
5. Nondelegation
Even if a delegation of authority to an agency is clear from the stat-
utory text, or is ambiguous but within the scope of deference shown to
the agency's interpretation, it could-at least in theory-be rejected by a
reviewing court on constitutional grounds. The nondelegation doctrine
provides that Congress may not delegate its legislative authority, at least
213. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 601
(2011).
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
beyond certain limits. U.S. Supreme Court doctrine holds that, if con-
gressional delegation of authority to an administrative agency provides
no "intelligible principle" on which the agency is to base its decisions, an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority has occurred.1 4
The doctrine is widely believed to be moribund-no law has been
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court on nondelegation grounds since the
1930s, and in the Court's most well-known recent nondelegation case, it
rejected a challenge to another CAA regulatory program.15 Neverthe-
less, there have been some attempts to revive the doctrine, most notably
by Justice Clarence Thomas. Most recently in Department of Transpor-
tation v. Association of American Railroads (decided in 2015), Justice
Thomas argued at length in a concurring opinion that
[w]e have too long abrogated our duty to enforce the separation
of powers required by our Constitution. We have overseen and
sanctioned the growth of an administrative system that concen-
trates the power to make laws and the power to enforce them in
the hands of a vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus
that finds no comfortable home in our constitutional structure.
The end result may be trains that run on time (although I doubt
it), but the cost is to our Constitution and the individual liberty
it protects.216
The doctrinal solution to this abrogation of duty, he argued, was revival
of the nondelegation doctrine.217 Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in
Whitman also advocated for revival of the doctrine, albeit not in that par-
218ticular case. Despite Justice Thomas' more than two decades of advo-
cacy, however, support from other Justices and from lower courts has not
generally been forthcoming.
However, there is 'at least a plausible argument that § 111 (d) vio-
lates the nondelegation doctrine even under its traditional understanding
(rather than whatever expanded version Justice Thomas would prefer).
Section 11 l(d)'s lack of guidance on compliance options (including trad-
ing) arguably leaves the EPA without an "intelligible principle" on which
to base its decisions regarding state plans. Congress, in other words, del-
egated oversight authority to the EPA in § 111 (d) without giving the
214. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body author-
ized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden del-
egation of legislative power.").
215. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472.
216. Dep't ofTransp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1254-55 (2015).
217. Id. at 1252 ("We should return to the original meaning of the Constitution: The
Government may create generally applicable rules of private conduct only through the
proper exercise of legislative power.").
218. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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agency any principled basis for exercising that authority other than the
purely procedural reference to § 110.
The silence of § 1 11 (d) with respect to trading is but one illustration
of this lack of an intelligible principle. The statute does not say whether
and when the EPA can reject state plans on the grounds that their speci-
fied "best system of emission reduction" (and therefore the standards'
stringency) is too lenient or too ambitious. Nor does it indicate (as dis-
cussed above) whether the EPA may accept state plans that will allow
some sources to exceed the stated performance standard due to trading.
The agency is (this argument suggests) forced to simply create criteria
for accepting or rejecting state plans out of whole cloth.
Congress could have written § 111(d) so as to delegate authority
over stringency to the EPA and authority over implementation to states,
with the EPA retaining authority to reject plans that will fail to meet the
EPA's stringency goals. This imaginary version of § 111 (d) would give
the EPA an "intelligible principle" for reviewing state plans closely mir-
roring that in § 110 (the threshold standard-setting part of which survived
nondelegation challenge in American Trucking).19
This argument, however, has significant weaknesses. The EPA
would argue that despite its brevity, § 111 (d) does cross the low "intelli-
gible principle" threshold. As the EPA has interpreted the § 11 l(d) pro-
cess, it does have primary responsibility for determining the level of
stringency that state plans must meet. If this view is correct, the agency
then does have an intelligible principle on which to base its decisions re-
garding state plans-whether those plans will actually result in sources in
the state meeting the EPA-specified emissions rate (individually or on
average). The result is a process that looks both procedurally and sub-
stantively very similar to the § 110 SfP process.
A related issue is that the EPA's interpretation of the division of au-
thority between it and states might be incorrect. Section 111 (d) arguably
delegates to states, not the EPA, the authority to determine the "best sys-
tem" and therefore the stringency of resulting performance standards.
Even under that view, however, the EPA could argue that it is still re-
sponsible for substantial oversight of state plans, including assessing
whether they properly identified the "best system" and complied with the
other requirements and considerations (cost, "adequately demonstrated,"
etc.) of performance standards as defined by the statute. Even if this re-
view is relatively perfunctory and formulaic, it would not lack an "intel-
ligible principle."
The U.S. Supreme Court's lack of receptiveness to nondelegation
challenges makes any argument along these lines a long shot, at best.
219. See generally id. (reviewing EPA's authority to set national air quality stand-
ards under § 108 of the CAA without regard to cost).
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American Trucking also provides strong evidence that even current U.S.
Supreme Court justices who are concerned about federal overreach and
skeptical of ambitious agency interpretations of statutes appear to be un-
willing to resort to the nondelegation doctrine.
Nevertheless, a nondelegation challenge to § 111 (d) would seem to
be substantially stronger than that to the § 110 NAAQS/SIP program at
issue in American Trucking. CAA § 108, the provision at issue in Amer-
ican Trucking, contains a fairly clear principle-it requires the EPA to
set national air quality standards at a level "requisite to protect public
health with an adequate margin of safety." Challengers argued that
§ 108 nevertheless lacked an intelligible principle since it provided the
agency with no other factors (cost presumably first among them) against
which to balance or measure its safety determination. The U.S. Supreme
Court rejected this challenge by finding that the safety requirement alone
is sufficient to establish an intelligible principle.220 But § 1 11 (d) explicit-
ly states no such criteria for approving state plans. As noted above, the
EPA could argue that the § 1 10(a)(1) definition of performance standard
gives such criteria, including cost. But taken alone, § 111 (d) gives the
EPA little, if any, guidance. It therefore may be somewhat more vulner-
able to a nondelegation challenge that § 108.
Though it appears unlikely, ruling § 111(d) unconstitutional on
nondelegation grounds would be extremely significant. Not only would
it eviscerate the EPA's CAA climate regulation, but it would also be
among the most important developments in recent administrative law-
the most important and surprising at least since Chevron.
Relatedly, a looming nondelegation issue could influence a review-
ing court's approach even if it does not formally decide the case on non-
delegation grounds. Cass Sunstein has argued that, even if courts no
longer decide cases based on the nondelegation doctrine, they have
adopted a "nondelegation canon."22' In other words, courts will interpret
a statute so as to avoid a nondelegation issue, just as they explicitly do to
avoid other constitutional issues. In this way, the presence of a colorable
nondelegation argument against trading in the CPP could make a court
more likely to reject trading under step one or step two of the traditional
Chevron framework, as discussed above.
C. Results
Again, the simplest and most likely result of a challenge to trading
under ESPS is probably a victory for the EPA under Chevron deference.
220. Id. at 464.
221. See Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHi. L. REv. 315, 315 (2000);
see also John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000
SuP. CT. REv. 223 (2000).
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Since the agency believes trading is permissible, that result would allow
states to employ it in their plans. But the opposite result appears possible
on a variety of grounds-the agency could still lose under Chevron, the
agency might not receive to Chevron deference, or the agency could face
a nondelegation challenge that cannot be easily dismissed. Trading un-
der § 111 ESPS faces a legal minefield. Given the significance of trad-
ing for the Plan, the resulting uncertainty has grave implications for the
success of the regulatory program.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
To date, arguments regarding the legality of trading under § 111 (d)
have focused on two battlegrounds. One is past EPA practice-
proponents of trading point to trading provisions in a single implemented
program for waste combustors and the failed CAMR rulemaking, while
critics point to the absence of trading in every other § 111 program. The
other battleground is over interpretation of one short phrase in the stat-
ute-the "best system of emission reduction."
As the above discussion illustrates, however, neither of these lines
of argument can decide the issue. Victory on either (or even both) bat-
tlegrounds would not establish that trading is legal (or illegal) under
§ 111 (d) performance standards. The rest of § 111 is similarly (and frus-
tratingly) unhelpful.
It may simply be that § 111 (d) falls somewhat short of being a mas-
terpiece of statutory drafting. It was a late addition to the statute and was
crafted as a compromise solution to a disagreement between the House
and Senate over how to treat a relatively narrow group of pollution
sources that otherwise might have fallen into a gap in the statute. It has
little structure or substance of its own. Its scope is defined by the source
categories created for § 11 l(b) NSPS, its procedure is imported directly
from § 110, and its substance comes mostly from the § 111 (a) definition
of performance standards (which, unfortunately, says nothing about
compliance options). In other words, § 111 (d) is a grab bag of tools and
content designed for other contexts. Clean Air Act critics complain that
the statute was never designed for the climate problem. Section 111 (d)
arguably wasn't designed at all. That wasn't a big problem when it was
a rarely used section of the statute aimed at small groups of sources. But
when § 111 (d) is brought to bear on the largest carbon-emitting sector in
the economy, any limitations are bound to show.
Perhaps the greatest such limitation is that emissions trading lacks a
strong foundation in the statute. As a result, neither proponents nor crit-
ics of trading (whether scholars and analysts today or litigants and judges
in the future) will have legal arguments as strong as they would like.
More accurately, neither side's arguments will be as strong as they claim.
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Uncertainty about the legality of trading as a compliance mecha-
nism is therefore much higher than most scholars and analysts-myself
included-have previously appreciated. Since trading is so crucial to the
cost-effectiveness and environmental ambition of the CPP, this legal un-
certainty means success of the Plan itself-and with it short-to-medium-
term U.S. climate policy-is also more uncertain than appreciated (even
if one takes a dim view of the facial challenges to the Plan that have been
filed or threatened to date).
My personal view remains that the arguments in favor of trading are
somewhat stronger than those against. This view, however, relies largely
on Chevron deference in the face of significant statutory ambiguity (and
the EPA's current interpretation in favor of trading) rather than any spe-
cific statutory text. Dicta in some recent U.S. Supreme Court cases
could, however, signal decreased willingness by some on the court to
show deference to agency interpretations that (as here) allow broad regu-
latory authority.222
This risk is arguably increased by the scope and economic signifi-
cance of the CPP. Chevron's doctrine of deference to agency interpreta-
tions of laws has deep roots in modem administrative law, and it appears
to work well for small ambiguities of limited significance. But when
ambiguities are great or their significance is large, Chevron and its moti-
vating intuitions break down. In such cases, courts have a variety of doc-
trines available to them for rejecting an agency's position. The simplest
is to find a Chevron step one or step two violation by interpreting silence
or ambiguity against the agency-though the latter is historically much
less common, the analysis in each step is arguably the same.
Particularly at the U.S. Supreme Court, where doctrinal flexibility is
broader, more innovative options are available to a skeptical court. Jus-
tice Scalia's repeated warnings to the EPA that "Congress does not hide
elephants in mouse holes" and that such efforts to base large programs on
narrow text will receive greater judicial scrutiny is an example of one
such option. These dicta can be interpreted as an attempt to narrow
Chevron or create a formal exception to it in high-stakes contexts. Al-
ternatively, a revival of the nondelegation doctrine, as advocated by Jus-
tice Thomas, would achieve similar results. A cautious court, of course,
would prefer to avoid constitutional questions but, as noted, a rejection
of the EPA's authority to allow trading under ESPS is at least possible
even on traditional Chevron grounds.
Beyond sketching out these possibilities, predicting the outcome of
a D.C. Circuit decision or the votes of U.S. Supreme Court justices
would be unwise. All that I can be confident of is that I don't know what
the outcome of a case challenging trading under § 111 (d) will be-to be
222. See supra Section VII.A.3 for a discussion of these dicta.
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precise, I am less confident in the outcome of such a case than I once
was, and less confident than most scholars appear to be today. My goal
in this Article is not, therefore, to predict a particular result but to flag as
uncertain a legal issue whose outcome many may have taken for granted.
That uncertainty alone has significant implications for the effective-
ness of the Clean Power Plan. As states and other stakeholders have fre-
quently (if predictably) complained, the timetable for states to submit
and implement plans is quite short, at least by regulatory standards. If
states cannot be sure that trading may be included in their plans, their de-
cisions become even more difficult. Some may eschew trading entirely,
due only to the risk that it will be declared illegal and they will lack suf-
ficient time to adjust, or in the interest of providing certainty to industry.
Alternatively, attempts to write plans that can be achieved with or with-
out trading (such as including trading but making it legally severable)
may require compromises that drive up costs even if trading is eventually
deemed legal.
One is tempted to conclude from this and other problems and ambi-
guities regarding interpretation of § 11 (d) that this section, to put it
charitably, falls somewhat short of the congressional drafters' finest
hour. That is perhaps not surprising-§ 111 (d) was apparently a very
late addition to the Clean Air Act, intended to fill a gap in regulatory
tools for existing sources that was only discovered near the end of the
legislative process. Had § 111 (d) been drafted earlier in the process, fur-
ther review and debate might have revealed its inadequacies and its par-
ticular lack of any guidance on compliance options.
A targeted amendment to § 111 (d) could solve many of its prob-
lems. For example, the analogy to § 110 could be made explicitly sub-
stantive as well as procedural, allowing importation of § 110's broad
scope of regulatory tools and compliance options (including "market-
based" tools) into § 111 (d) regulation. Alternatively, § 111 could be
modified so as to make it clear that regulated emitters may only use
compliance options available at each plant (and therefore, that regulators
may only consider such measures when setting stringency). This latter
option would clearly limit the cost-effectiveness of § 111 (d) regulations,
but would at least resolve the uncertainty.
Unfortunately there is little chance of any such clarifying amend-
ment to the Clean Air Act given the current congressional political
makeup and the controversy surrounding the CPP in particular. That is a
minor tragedy today, and should lengthy litigation delay or ultimately de-
rail the CPP because of ambiguity over trading, it will become a maj or
one.
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